Forensic Economics by Zitzewitz, Eric
Dartmouth College 
Dartmouth Digital Commons 





Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa 
 Part of the Economics Commons, and the Forensic Science and Technology Commons 
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation 
Zitzewitz, Eric, "Forensic Economics" (2012). Dartmouth Scholarship. 2428. 
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/2428 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Work at Dartmouth Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Dartmouth Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Dartmouth Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact dartmouthdigitalcommons@groups.dartmouth.edu. 




In many subfields of economics, under-standing behavior that agents would prefer 
to conceal has become a central component 
of the research agenda. In development, gov-
ernment corruption is viewed as one of the 
most important impediments to growth. In 
finance and health care, understanding how 
agents resolve conflicts between fiduciary 
duties and competing interests is crucial 
to many questions. In industrial organiza-
tion, the welfare implications of industrial 
structures or auction designs often depend 
crucially on the extent of collusion.1 Many 
important topics in labor, public, and educa-
tion economics, such as racial discrimination, 
tax evasion, and teacher shirking, involve 
behaviors that agents are unlikely to confess.
These research questions have prompted 
academic economists to engage in what this 
survey will refer to as “forensic econom-
ics.” Traditionally, forensic economics has 
referred to the application of economics to 
the detection and quantification of harm 
from behavior that has become the sub-
ject of litigation, and has been practiced by 
experts who are paid by the court or one of 
the parties.2 The academic forensic econom-
ics reviewed here also applies economics to 
1 See, for example, Klemperer (2002), who argues that 
auction designs that produce the most revenue when 
bidders behave noncooperatively are the least robust to 
collusion.
2 This is the focus of the National Association of Forensic 




A new meta-field of “forensic economics” has begun to emerge, uncovering evidence 
of hidden behavior in a variety of domains. Examples include teachers cheating on 
exams, road builders skimping on materials, violations of U.N. sanctions, unnecessary 
heart surgeries, and racial biases in employment decisions, traffic stops, auto retailing, 
and even sports judging. In each case, part of the contribution of economic analysis 
is in uncovering evidence of wrongdoing. Although research questions differ, forensic 
economic work shares commonalities in approaches and limitations. This article 
seeks to draw out the common threads, with the hope of stimulating further research 
across fields. (JEL K13)
* Dartmouth College. I am grateful first to Justin 
Wolfers, who worked on the initial outline of this article 
with me but withdrew from the project due to compet-
ing time commitments. Thanks also to Janet Currie, 
Stefano DellaVigna, Ray Fisman, Roger Gordon, Eliana 
La Ferrara, Steven Levitt, Jonathan Reuter, Jay Ritter, 
Jonathan Skinner, Christopher Snyder, Doug Staiger, and 
four anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Any 
errors or omissions are my own. I consult on a few of the 
financial issues discussed in this article, including portfo-
lio valuation, mutual fund share trading, portfolio trading 
costs, and settlement-to-harm ratios.
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. L (September 2012)732
detecting and quantifying behavior, but does 
so with a different motivation: to advance 
the general understanding of behavior that 
is important to the functioning (or disfunc-
tion) of the economy. In some forensic 
economics work, the academic economist 
generates the first evidence of a particu-
lar behavior. More commonly though, the 
economist sizes the extent of an activity 
about which there had been only anecdotal 
evidence and provides insight into where it 
is more prevalent and why.
Forensic economics is usually neces-
sary because the agents engaged in a par-
ticular behavior prefer to keep it hidden. 
Motivations for hiding behavior vary—in 
many of the examples discussed below, the 
behavior in question is very likely illegal. In 
other cases, behavior may be a violation of 
contract terms. In still others, it may be a vio-
lation of ethical norms. In each case, there 
may be significant controversy as to which 
side of the line on which behavior falls. In 
selecting papers to discuss, I choose those 
dealing with economically important hidden 
behavior that I judged would be generally 
considered to be at least unethical. Ethical 
behavior is often hidden for various reasons 
(e.g., a desire for privacy), but I will leave it, 
as well as behavior that is generally readily 
admitted, outside the scope of the review.3 
3 Inevitably, there are some borderline cases. 
Notwithstanding other motivations, hiding behavior can 
sometimes be an indication that an agent expects others to 
view their actions as unethical. In my experience, produc-
tion workers generally admit that they would work harder 
under a piece rate than an hourly wage (as Lazear 2000 
finds), but teachers would not admit to the levels of absen-
teeism uncovered by Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan’s (2008) 
work, discussed below. Likewise, many teachers would 
admit teaching the subjects covered by a test, but not 
cheating on the test (as documented by Jacob and Levitt 
2003a and 2003b). Sales staff would likely admit working 
hard to generate sales before a quarter-end in response to 
an incentive nonlinearity, but not offering large discounts 
to get nonincremental business shifted forward in time (as 
documented by Larkin 2007).
Forensic economics is sometimes work 
that could be done by regulators or other 
third parties. The need or opportunity for 
economists to get involved arises for differ-
ent reasons. In some cases, the subjects of 
forensic economic work are corrupt govern-
ment officials or captured regulators them-
selves, agents who obviously have limited 
incentive to self-investigate. In other cases, 
corruption, capture or simply conflict avoid-
ance by those in regulatory roles may help 
explain the space left for outside investiga-
tion. In still other cases, the activity uncov-
ered by forensic economics is not illegal, and 
perhaps not even of regulatory interest, but 
is nevertheless economically important. 
Beyond regulatory incentive problems, in 
many cases, economists get involved because 
economics gives them a comparative advan-
tage. Wrongdoers may cover their tracks well 
enough to fool traditional forensic investiga-
tors, but they leave distortions in the data 
that economic analysis can detect.
The work by Heron and Lie (2007) and oth-
ers on executive stock option backdating pro-
vides a compelling example. Executive stock 
options grants receive more favorable tax and 
accounting treatment when they are granted 
with strike prices that are at-the-money (i.e., 
equal to the current share price). Obviously, 
options with low strike prices (those that 
provide the executive with the option to pur-
chase company stock at a lower price) are 
more valuable to executives. Thus the temp-
tation may exist for executives to arrange 
grants with low strike prices but to represent 
the grants as having been made at-the-money 
at the time of the grant. This can be done by 
choosing a day from the recent past on which 
the stock price was low and claiming that an 
option grant was made on that day.
Indeed, the typical stock option grant 
appeared quite fortunately timed from the 
perspective of the executive—granting com-
pany stock prices tended to drop  immediately 
before the grant and rise afterwards. Market 
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efficiency requires that postgrant stock 
returns be uncorrelated with information 
that was public on grant day, assuming that 
was really when the decision was made. 
The correlation between grants and future 
returns suggests two possibilities: (1) execu-
tives were granting options when their pri-
vate information suggested their stock was 
undervalued, or (2) executives were choosing 
dates after the fact that turned out to be stock 
price lows. While the first possibility might 
be considered insider trading, misrepresent-
ing grant dates in order to characterize option 
grants as at-the-money was more serious, as 
it constituted both tax and accounting fraud.4 
Consistent with the second possibility, Heron 
and Lie found that the correlation between 
grants and future stock returns declined 
sharply after the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted a rule requir-
ing grants to be disclosed within two days, 
and the remaining positive correlation came 
mainly from firms that filed the required 
disclosure late. Newspaper and regulatory 
investigations of the most egregious cases 
subsequently confirmed that several firms 
had indeed backdated their option grants.
Heron and Lie’s work relies on the theory 
of efficient financial markets for the null 
hypothesis that allows it to identify back-
dating. In their study of racial profiling by 
police, Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) 
likewise use economic theory to develop a 
null hypothesis to distinguish between taste-
based and statistical discrimination. The key 
insight from their economic model is that so 
long as every “type” of car is searched with 
probability less than one (where type includes 
the race of the driver and other characteris-
tics observable only to the officer), then the 
4 The initial work on the correlation between option 
grants and subsequent stock returns focused on execu-
tives’ private information as the explanation (e.g., Yermack 
1997; Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy 
2001). Like Heron and Lie, Lie (2005) and Narayanan and 
Seyhun (2008) focus on a backdating explanation.
marginal return to searching a given type 
of car must equal the average return. Thus 
if we assume that police seek to maximize 
felony drug arrests, and the average police 
search of a black motorist’s car is less likely to 
find drugs than the average police search of a 
white motorist’s car, it implies that the police 
are over searching black motorists relative to 
whites, perhaps due to a taste for doing so. 
Knowles, Persico, and Todd actually find that 
searches of black motorists’ cars are slightly 
more likely to find drugs, implying that 
the higher search rates for black motorists 
would be due to statistical discrimination, 
rather than tastes.5 While this might not be 
of much immediate comfort to the innocent 
black motorists who have to endure higher 
search rates, understanding motivations for 
discrimination is crucial to designing policies 
to alleviate its effects. 
These examples illustrate a typical rela-
tionship between economics, forensic eco-
nomics, and forensics. Economics provides a 
null hypothesis whose violation suggests hid-
den activity. Forensic economics documents 
the violation (or its absence) and provides 
evidence on potential alternative explana-
tions. Traditional forensic investigation then 
gathers the specific evidence needed to con-
vict or exonerate specific individuals. Along 
the way, the field of economics makes a con-
tribution to society and learns, via a clinical 
study, about how agents balance the tempta-
tions and consequences of the hidden behav-
ior in question.
While the questions addressed by foren-
sic economics differ in different subfields, 
the techniques and underlying econom-
ics are actually quite similar. This is all 
the more surprising given that forensic 
 economics seems to be developing almost 
5 In contrast, Anwar and Fang (2006) find higher search 
rates and lower success rates for searches of black motor-
ists by the Florida State Police, suggesting a role for taste-
based discrimination.
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independently in different subfields (at 
least, based on an informal analysis of cita-
tion patterns). Given that existing reviews 
of forensic economics papers have typically 
focused on a small number of papers in a 
single subfield or topic, a contribution of 
this paper will be to review a broad range 
of papers from different fields in a way that 
highlights their similarities in how econom-
ics is applied.6 
The next section presents a taxonomy of 
forensic economics papers, discussing over 
100 different studies. The following section 
reviews some of the common themes from 
the substantive conclusions of the studies 
and then turns to some higher-level ques-
tions. What does economics learn from 
forensic economics? Why has forensic eco-
nomics had dramatic policy impact in some 
cases, but limited impact in others? How 
can policy either facilitate or frustrate foren-
sic economics? To preview, a key question 
is whether policymakers view themselves 
as the principals cheated by hidden behav-
ior, or as the allies of the agents doing the 
cheating. When policymakers have viewed 
themselves as principals, they have used 
forensic economics approaches and results 
to change agents’ incentives, through policy 
and enforcement thereof, and they have 
engaged forensic economists by forcing the 
disclosure of data needed to produce the 
next round of results. In contrast, where 
policymakers have taken the opposite view, 
forensic economics results have had limited 
impact, and data availability has even been 
curtailed. 
6 Past reviews that have included forensic economics 
papers include Ritter (2008) and Macey and O’Hara (2009) 
for finance, Svensson (2005) and Fisman and Miguel 
(2008a and 2008b) for developing country corruption, 
Porter (2005) for collusion in auctions, Healy and Whalen 
(1999) for earnings management, and Slemrod (2007) for 
tax evasion.
2. A Taxonomy
Most forensic economics work identifies 
hidden behavior by testing data against a 
null hypothesis, which is often derived from 
 economic theory. We can classify analyses by 
the source of identification and discuss the 
work in five groups.
The first, and simplest, approach to detect-
ing hidden behavior is simply to observe it 
directly. Some economists have found direct 
evidence of wrongdoing in data collected by 
others, others have constructed the measures 
themselves, while still others have run audit 
studies or field experiments to detect it.
A second, related, approach is to iden-
tify hidden behavior by constructing two 
measures that capture the same economic 
activity, but are affected differently by hid-
den behavior. As with the direct observation 
studies, in some cases the economist finds 
two measures of the same outcome in official 
data, while in other cases he or she generates 
the second measure. In these studies, the 
null hypothesis is that hidden behavior is the 
main or only reason the two measures should 
differ, and concern about alternative expla-
nations focuses on potential other  reasons 
for differences.
A third approach is to examine how a sin-
gle outcome, that is potentially the product 
of both honest and hidden behavior, var-
ies with the incentives for hidden behav-
ior. Here the null hypothesis is that hidden 
behavior is the only reason the outcome 
would vary with these incentives. Ruling out 
potential omitted variables is a crucial issue 
with these studies. One strategy is to exploit 
discontinuous changes in the incentives for 
hidden behavior, resulting, for instance, 
from sudden changes in enforcement. 
Another strategy is to generate the variation 
through a field experiment. In some settings, 
the economist feels comfortable arguing that 
controlling for observables is sufficient to 
address these issues.
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A fourth approach is to build a model of 
honest behavior and test the data for devia-
tions from that model. For example, work 
that tests for collusion in product markets 
or auctions often begins with a model of 
 noncooperative behavior and checks for 
deviations that are consistent with collusion. 
Models are not always formal or even eco-
nomic. A number of studies identify hidden 
behavior using statistical models that find 
hidden behavior by looking for outliers, such 
as odd patterns on test answer sheets in par-
ticular classrooms or very high open heart 
surgery rates in particular towns. 
A fifth approach exploits the predictions of 
efficient market or price theory. One strategy 
exploits the fact that future asset returns in 
an efficient financial market should be dif-
ficult to forecast using public information, so 
if a decision (e.g., to grant stock options or 
place a mutual fund trade) supposedly taken 
at time t is correlated with returns from t to 
t + s that make the decision more profitable, 
this is good indication that it was really taken 
at time t + s. Another strategy exploits set-
tings in which efficient markets aggregate 
information and provide an estimate of the 
scope of hidden behavior. 
The above taxonomy is one of techniques, 
not papers. Many studies combine multiple 
techniques, such as by using one to estab-
lish a main result and another to examine 
alternative explanations. For instance, direct 
observation and measurement consistency 
studies often also test whether apparent hid-
den behavior is correlated with incentives for 
it. In settings where the enforcement envi-
ronment changed suddenly (sometimes due 
to the circulation of a paper’s first draft), stud-
ies often check whether the evidence of hid-
den behavior was simultaneously reduced.
2.1 Direct Observation
In a few settings, economists have not 
needed to use economics to help detect 
 hidden behavior because they have been 
able to observe it directly. Examples include 
studies where the researchers have found 
their evidence in preexisting datasets, by col-
lecting data themselves, or by uncovering 
 hidden behavior through an audit study or 
field experiment.
Christie and Schultz (1994 and 1995) pro-
vide an example of finding hidden behavior 
that was “hiding in plain sight” in official 
data. Using data on trades and quotes pro-
vided them by Nasdaq, Christie and Schultz 
find that Nasdaq market makers avoided 
quoting certain stocks in odd-eighths. They 
interpret this as evidence of collusion to 
maintain a higher minimum tick size (an 
important determinant of market maker 
profit). Support for this conclusion comes 
from that fact that the incidence of odd-
eighth quoting increased sharply on the 
exact day their original study was publicized, 
which Christie, Harris, and Schultz (1994) 
argues was consistent with the publicity 
causing the collusive agreement to collapse.
Another direct observation example is 
provided by Fisman and Miguel (2007), who 
obtained data from New York City on park-
ing ticket nonpayment by United Nations 
diplomats. Fisman and Miguel find more 
nonpayment by diplomats from countries 
with reputations for more corruption, as 
reflected in cross-country surveys. This 
both provides an independent validation 
for these corruption perception surveys and 
also suggests that arguably petty unethical 
behavior may be correlated with more seri-
ous unethical behavior. Levitt (2006) also 
studies petty unethical behavior, using data 
from an entrepreneur who sells bagels and 
donuts in offices using a lockbox and an 
honor system. The honor system works rea-
sonably well, with an 11 percent theft rate. 
Theft declined sharply after September 11, 
2001, is higher after price increases, and is 
33 percentage points (!) higher at nonprof-
its. Company fixed effects have significant 
explanatory power. Levitt argues that these 
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results  suggest that perceived fairness affects 
decisions to engage in unethical behavior. 
Both the parking ticket and the bagel results 
hint that certain subpopulations may develop 
a sense of entitlement to at least small-scale 
unethical behavior, and that this may be cor-
related with larger misdeeds.
Edelman and Larkin (2009) provide 
directly observed evidence of misbehavior 
by another category of nonprofit employees: 
academic researchers. The Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN) tracks downloads 
of academic papers and compiles lists of the 
most downloaded papers in a given topic 
area in the last sixty days. Placement on these 
lists presumably increases the visibility of the 
paper, which might be especially important to 
less-known researchers and those approach-
ing tenure reviews. Download statistics are 
also used by some institutions in evaluating 
their scholars. Initially SSRN counted all 
downloads, including multiple downloads by 
the same Internet Protocol (IP) address, so 
researchers could easily inflate their papers’ 
statistics. Edelman and Larkin analyze the 
frequency of suspicious downloads (24 per-
cent of the total!) and find that they vary 
with demographics such as field (economists 
make fewer suspicious downloads than those 
in finance, law, management, and account-
ing). Edelman and Larkin find more suspi-
cious downloads for papers that are near 
the boundary of top-ten-list qualification, 
where incentives for inflation may be higher. 
Perhaps surprisingly though, they do not 
find evidence that suspicious downloading 
declines after scholars are tenured, when 
incentives for it presumably decline. One 
possibly is that this form of unethical behav-
ior is habit-forming, and thus persists even 
when incentives for it are weakened.
In three other examples, researchers 
generated their own direct observations of 
illegal behavior. Olken and Barron (2009) 
hired surveyors to ride along with  truckers 
in Indonesia and observe over 6,000 bribe 
payments to police officers, soldiers, and 
weigh station attendants. They find that 
bribe demands reflect more economic 
 sophistication than one might have sup-
posed. When the Indonesian army was with-
drawn from half of a major trucking route, 
bribe demands on the other half rose, but 
total bribe demands on the entire route 
declined, consistent with the checkpoints 
operating in a decentralized manner and 
taking double marginalization concerns into 
account. Levitt and Venkatesh (2000 and 
2007) analyzed drug gang finances and street 
prostitution, respectively, using data they 
collected directly from participants. Apart 
from the low compensation for engaging in 
such risky behavior, one of the striking find-
ings is the level of complicity of the Chicago 
police, who prostitutes “are more likely to 
have sex with . . . than get officially arrested 
by” (abstract of the latter paper).
In a final set of direct observation studies, 
forensic economists run audit study experi-
ments to directly observe hidden behavior 
in the field.7 One of the oldest examples 
are audit studies of racial discrimination by 
realtors (e.g., Yinger 1986). Ondrich, Ross, 
and Yinger (2003) examine the data from 
one such study in which matched pairs of 
white and black couples approached real 
estate agents asking to see a specific house. 
The authors find that agents were less likely 
to show a requested house to all customers 
when it is in an integrated suburban neigh-
borhood but were more likely to show blacks 
these houses than whites. Agents are also 
more likely to steer blacks away from their 
initially requested house, except when the 
house has visible problems. Agent marketing 
efforts increase with the initially requested 
house’s asking price for whites but not blacks. 
The authors argue that agent behavior could 
be consistent with either taste-based or 
7 See List (2006) for a general overview of field experi-
ment methodology.
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 statistical discrimination (potentially based 
on misinformed preconceptions) about aver-
age preferences of races for certain house 
 characteristics and a desire to maximize 
transaction probabilities.
Audit studies have also tested for labor 
market discrimination on race (see Fix 
and Turner 1998 for a review) or gender 
(Neumark 1996) or discrimination in com-
mercial settings (Ayres and Siegelman 1995; 
Yinger 1998; Riach and Rich 2002; List 
2004). In general, these studies do find dis-
parities in the treatment of different groups, 
but these findings and their interpretation 
have been critiqued on several grounds. 
One criticism of audit studies involving in-
person visits is that, despite the training 
that auditors undergo, the auditors may dif-
fer in ways unobservable to the researcher 
that the auditee believes are correlated 
with productivity (Heckman and Siegelman 
1993). A second, related, criticism is that 
the auditors know the nature of the study in 
which they are undertaking, and may con-
sciously or unconsciously vary their effort 
levels or behave in ways that seem artificial 
to different degrees. Audit studies involving 
resumes (Jowell and Prescott-Clarke 1970; 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Banerjee 
et al. 2009) can make resumes identi-
cal except for a name, which is chosen to 
signal race.8 Even that approach has been 
critiqued on the grounds that distinctively 
black names may signal more than just race, 
such as a disadvantaged background (Fryer 
and Levitt 2004).9 While discrimination 
8 Hanna and Leigh Linden (2009) conduct a related experi-
ment in which they attach false cover sheets with randomly 
generated demographic characteristics (age, gender, caste) to 
exams in India. They find grading discriminates against low-
caste “students,” and, interestingly, that the discrimination 
comes only from teachers who are themselves low-caste.
9 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) address this cri-
tique by separately examining the effects of high-edu-
cation and low-education black and white names. They 
find that names typically used by high-education black 
mothers still receive fewer callbacks than those used by a 
against black-sounding names may in practice 
disadvantage many of the same individuals 
as racial discrimination, as discussed above, 
understanding mechanisms is important to 
policy implications. A third critique of audit 
studies is that they may capture disparities in 
treatment during the search process, but these 
disparities may only result in small impacts on 
ultimate outcomes, such as employment or 
wages (e.g., Heckman 1998).10 This highlights 
an important caveat for many forensic eco-
nomic, and indeed many nonforensic, results: 
welfare implications of findings are not always 
as straightforward as they may first appear.
2.2  Measure Comparison
In settings where economists are not able 
to directly observe hidden behavior, they 
need to devise a statistical test to detect 
it. One of the simplest null hypotheses in 
forensic economics is that two measures of 
the same economic activity should yield sim-
ilar results, at least in the absence of activ-
ity that is hidden from one of the measures. 
In this section, I review several versions of 
this approach: studies that compare official 
data from two sources, those that compare 
data self-reported by agents with data from 
a second source, those that compare inputs 
and outputs, and those that compare official 
data with a second measure generated by 
the economist.
 lower-education white mother. At least if one assumes that 
employers infer race and education from names equally 
well, this suggests employer preferences are over race 
rather than mothers’ education.
10 Heckman’s critique is illustrated by Goldberg (1996), 
who finds that mean and median markups paid for cars 
in actual transactions do not vary by race and gender, 
although minority purchase prices have higher dispersion. 
She suggests that some minorities may have high reserva-
tion prices (due to high information or search costs), caus-
ing all minorities to therefore face statistical discrimination 
in the initial offers they receive. But the absence of a dif-
ference in mean transaction prices suggests that minori-
ties with lower reservation prices improve on these offers 
through bargaining.
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2.2.1  Two Official Sources
As an example of a paper comparing 
official data from two sources, Fisman and 
Wei (2004) compare Hong Kong’s reported 
exports to China and China’s reported 
imports from Hong Kong. They treat the 
difference, shipments reported as exports 
to Hong Kong but not as imports to China, 
as an “evasion gap.” One might be tempted 
to dismiss this gap as a statistical discrep-
ancy, but the authors find that it is larger for 
products where Chinese tariffs are higher 
and smaller for products with high tariffs on 
closely related products. These correlations 
suggest that tariffs are evaded in part by mis-
classifying products into lower tariff catego-
ries; it is difficult to imagine why a statistical 
discrepancy from another source would be 
correlated in exactly this manner. Topalova, 
Mishra, and Subramanian (2007) conduct a 
related analysis using variation across both 
products and time in Indian tariffs (before 
and after large reductions in the 1990s). 
They likewise find more “missing imports” 
when tariffs are higher.
Fisman and Wei (2007) conduct an analo-
gous test for “missing exports” of cultural 
artifacts to the United States; shipments that 
are reported to the United States but not to 
their country of origin. They find more miss-
ing exports for countries regarded as more 
corrupt on international surveys, and that 
a similar correlation does not exist for toys. 
This last “placebo” test suggests that smug-
gling is behind the original result, as opposed 
to a general undercounting of exports in cor-
rupt countries. 
In the Fisman and Wei papers, the differ-
ences between import and export statistics 
arose from differing incentives for under-
reporting to the two different countries. 
Like Topalova, Mishra, and Subramanian, 
Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) 
examine a setting in which incentives for 
misreporting change over time. Specifically, 
they compare the 2002 and 2004 versions of 
Thomson Financial’s I/B/E/S stock analyst 
recommendation data (in both cases, the 
data covering the 1993–2002 time period). 
The 2004 version followed regulatory inves-
tigations of conflicts of interest and optimism 
bias in recommendations during the dot-
com era; these investigations understandably 
led certain analysts and their employers to 
wish that some past bullish recommenda-
tions be forgotten about. Since these bro-
kerages are both sources and customers of 
Thomson Financial, Thomson might have 
had an incentive to favor their interests over 
those of other consumers of the data. The 
authors find many instances of recommen-
dations being changed, anonymized, added, 
and deleted. Deleted recommendations 
were disproportionately strong buys; added 
recommendations were disproportionately 
holds and sells. Changes were dispropor-
tionately from buy to sell. Anonymizations 
were disproportionately strong buy recom-
mendations of stocks that subsequently 
underperformed; anonymizations were also 
more likely for analysts who remained in the 
industry than for those who exited. After 
Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston circulated a 
working paper, Thomson Financial reversed 
many of the changes made to the 2004 ver-
sion of the data, attributing them to a series 
of computer errors (see the published ver-
sion of the paper and Ritter [2008] for more 
details). 
Zinman and Zitzewitz (2009) provide 
an example of a study that compares self-
reported and official data and that exploits 
even higher-frequency variation in incen-
tives for misreporting. We compare “snow 
reports” of new natural snowfall issued by ski 
resorts with data from surrounding govern-
ment weather stations. The resorts report 
more snow than the government, which 
could of course be due to the resorts being 
located on especially snowy mountains. We 
find though that this gap is much larger on 
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weekends, especially for resorts that cater 
to experts and are within driving distance of 
major cities. Given the absence of a week-
end effect in true precipitation, this result 
suggests that resorts engage in deceptive 
advertising, especially when the returns to 
it are high.
Snyder and Zidar’s (2009) study of resume 
padding by economists provides another 
example of comparing self-reported with 
official data. Snyder and Zidar compare pub-
lications listed in vitas posted on the web 
with journals’ tables of contents. They find 
that while outright fabrication of publica-
tions is extremely rare, more subtle forms of 
inflation are more common (e.g., mischar-
acterizing a Papers and Proceedings article 
as a regular American Economic Review 
article; including invited articles among peer 
reviewed).
2.2.2  Inputs and Outputs
Turning to studies that compare inputs 
and outputs, Sukhtankar (2011) provides the 
most literal example in his study of corrup-
tion in Indian sugar mills. Sugar production 
is very close to a fixed proportions technol-
ogy; if sugar cane is crushed but sugar is not 
produced, it is very likely that output was 
diverted. Sukhtankar finds that sugar mills 
suffer declines in their output–input ratio 
in election years, especially for those mills 
controlled by politicians who are contesting 
the election. He argues that this is consistent 
with the politicians diverting resources from 
the mills to finance their campaigns, and he 
finds evidence that the farmer-members are 
compensated by receiving higher prices the 
next year if the politician in question wins. 
Another example of identifying hidden 
behavior by comparing outputs and inputs 
is the “return gap” measure of Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, and Zheng (2008). The authors com-
pare the returns of a mutual fund (with fees 
and expenses added back) to the returns of its 
most recently disclosed prior holdings. This 
gap is negative for the average fund, which 
helps explain why the average equity mutual 
funds underperforms the stock market even 
after adjusting for expenses. The return 
gap has many potential explanations, since 
it would capture the profitability of trades 
done since the most recent holdings disclo-
sure and might be negative on average due 
to commissions and other transactions costs. 
The authors show however that return gaps 
are more persistent than the returns them-
selves, which they argue is consistent with 
the pro- or anti-investor nature of a fund’s 
hidden actions being more persistent than 
the returns of its holdings. They also find that 
differences in return gaps are consistent with 
the incentives for cross-subsidization faced 
by fund families (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 
2006). Small, young funds, with low expenses 
and strong recent and inflows performance 
have future inflows that are much more sen-
sitive to $1 of extra return than larger, older, 
high-expense, and poorly performing funds. 
If fund families face choices about how to 
allocate shares in hot initial public offerings 
(IPOs) or which fund trades a given stock 
first, they face a temptation to favor funds 
with more performance-sensitive inflows in 
ways that would produce the patterns found 
by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng.
Morey and O’Neal (2006) also compare 
mutual fund returns with the returns of their 
prior disclosed holdings, but with a different 
objective. Morey and O’Neal find that bond 
mutual funds’ returns are more correlated 
with lower-credit-quality bond returns than 
one would expect from their disclosed hold-
ings. They also find that bond fund returns 
become more correlated with safer bonds 
around holdings disclosure dates. They con-
clude that bond funds engage in “window 
dressing,” altering their holdings around dis-
closure dates “to present a safer portfolio to 
shareholders.”
Baicker and Staiger (2005) provide a fis-
cal example of an input–output gap. They 
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test for diversion of matching funds distrib-
uted to county hospitals under Medicaid’s 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) pro-
gram. DSH was a matching funds program, 
intended to motivate higher state spending 
at hospitals that served the poor, but states 
could game the program by reversing trans-
fers of funds once those funds were matched 
by the federal government. For example, 
Baicker and Staiger cite several exam-
ples of such transfers from a Government 
Accountability Office report, such as a 
Michigan nursing facility that received a 
$277 million DSH payment from the state 
(that was 50 percent federally reimbursed) 
and wired $271 million back to the state the 
same day (348). They find that counties that 
receive an extra $1 under DSH report net 
intergovernmental transfers in the Survey 
of Governmental Finances that are only 57 
cents higher. This suggests that the remain-
ing 43 cents was either transferred to other 
governments or offset by a decline in other 
transfers to the county in question, suggest-
ing that transfers of matched funds back to 
states are quite common. The authors find 
that their estimate of nondiverted DSH 
funds are much more positively associated 
with patient outcomes than their estimate of 
diverted DSH funds, helping to explain why 
previous analyses had found limited benefits 
from DSH funds.
2.2.3  Researcher-Created Second Measures 
In a final set of studies, second measures 
were unavailable and they needed to be cre-
ated as part of the research. Clotfelter (1983) 
uses data from a project in which the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Services (IRS) randomly 
selected personal income tax returns for 
audit and estimates what he calls “the sum 
of evasion and favorable errors of interpre-
tation” (365). He finds more underreporting 
for returns with high marginal tax rates (con-
trolling for income) and returns with more 
income that was not reported to the IRS by 
another party (e.g., self employment income, 
as opposed to wages, interest, or dividends).
Olken (2006) estimates rice received from 
a Indonesian government transfer program 
from a survey of recipients and compares this 
with administrative data on rice distributed. 
He estimates that 18 percent of the rice was 
stolen, and that the missing share was higher 
in sparsely populated and ethnically hetero-
geneous areas. Reinikka and Svensson (2004 
and 2005) compare administrative data on 
Ugandan central government school appro-
priations with estimates of money that actu-
ally reached the schools, finding that only 13 
percent of funds did in 1991–95, but that this 
rose to 91 percent after a newspaper cam-
paign and other reforms. Larger and better 
connected schools suffered less resource 
diversion in the earlier period.
Jin and Kato (2006) uncover smaller scale 
fraud by purchasing baseball cards on EBay, 
obtaining independent ratings of the quality 
of these cards, and comparing these with self-
reported quality. They find that sellers who 
self-report quality tend to over claim, rela-
tive to sellers who invest in third-party veri-
fication. Buyer’s bidding behavior reveals an 
excessive willingness to pay for self-reported, 
as opposed to verified, quality. Jin and Kato 
also find that sellers who self-report exag-
gerated qualities are also more likely to fail 
to deliver a card entirely, providing another 
example of a correlation in small and larger-
scale unethical behavior. 
In summary, measure consistency studies 
identify a gap between two alternative mea-
sures of the same outcome. In the studies 
mentioned above, differences in the mea-
sures arise due to either lying (e.g., about 
income, imports, snowfall, bond portfolio 
risk, publications, or baseball card quality) 
or resource diversion (e.g., of sugar, rice, or 
Medicare payments). Differences in the mea-
sures could also have more innocent expla-
nations, so the studies usually then examine 
the correlation of gaps with the  profitability 
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or feasibility of hidden behavior to deter-
mine its likely explanation. Alternative expla-
nations for these correlations may exist, but 
their potential role is reduced by the fact 
that the dependent variable is a gap between 
two related measures, netting out otherwise 
problematic confounding factors.
2.3  Correlations with Incentives 
In a larger group of forensic econom-
ics studies, researchers have only one out-
come measure, which reflects both honest 
activity and potential hidden behavior. The 
researcher then tests whether this measure 
varies with the profitability or feasibility of 
hidden behavior.
These studies face an identification prob-
lem common to much other empirical work, 
namely distinguishing between causation 
and correlation through other mechanisms. 
Three broad approaches are to: (1) exploit 
exisiting discontinuities in incentives, (2) 
to generate variation in incentives using an 
experiment, and (3) to identify situations 
where confounding factors can be convinc-
ingly ruled out, and thus correlations are suf-
ficient evidence.
2.3.1  Discontinuities
One approach is to identify cases where 
incentives for hidden behavior vary dis-
continuously, but other reasons for correla-
tions vary continuously.11 Sudden changes in 
policies provide one such discontinuity. As 
mentioned above, many forensic econom-
ics studies bolster their main evidence by 
examining changes in agent behavior when 
regulatory investigations into the practice 
in question are announced. The studies 
reviewed in this subsection use discontinui-
ties in incentives as their main means of iden-
tifying hidden behavior. These  discontinuities 
11 This empirical technique, often called regression dis-
continuity, is used in many nonforensic applications (see 
Imbens and Lemieux 2008 for a recent review).
can arise from changes in government policy, 
technology, or other external events, or can 
be discontinuities built into existing incen-
tive schemes themselves.
Changes in policy, technology, or other 
external factors often create discontinu-
ous changes in the incentives for hidden 
behavior. Jin and Leslie (2003) study a 
policy change in Los Angeles that required 
restaurants to post a report card disclosing 
their hygiene inspection score. They find 
that hygiene scores improve and that hospi-
talizations for food-borne illnesses decline 
sharply, suggesting an improvement in true 
hygiene accompanied the improved scores. 
In a later paper, Jin and Leslie (2009) find 
that pre-mandatory-disclosure hygiene was 
poorer (and improvements due to disclosure 
larger) at franchisee-owned chain outlets, 
especially those with low repeat business. 
When a franchisee owns an outlet with low 
(outlet-level) repeat business, he or she does 
not internalize the effects of poor cleanliness 
on the reputation of the rest of the chain.
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) examine 
the effects of auditing on government pro-
curement. They find that the prices paid by 
hospitals in Buenos Aires to private-sector 
suppliers fall by 15 percent during a crack-
down on corruption. They find that the 
crackdown has a greater effect in reducing 
the prices paid by higher-wage officials. This 
is consistent with an efficiency-wage theory 
of official honesty due to Becker and Stigler 
(1974), in which higher-wage officials engage 
in less corruption to avoid risking being fired. 
Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti (2009) analyze 
dispersion in prices paid for similar items 
by different Italian public bodies. They use 
the addition and deletion of items from a 
centrally negotiated price list, which public 
bodies can but are not required to utilize, to 
distinguish between overpayment for active 
reasons (e.g., receiving bribes from the sup-
plier) and passive reasons (e.g., lacking the 
time or motivation to price shop). They find 
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that the likelihood of buying via the central 
agreement is higher when the ratio of the 
agreement price to the outside price is lower, 
which they argue is more consistent with 
passive waste, since officials appear to use 
the central price list to avoid overpayment 
when it is made easier for them to do so.
Shocks to effective enforcement can be 
generated by a change in the identity of the 
regulator. In Zitzewitz (2002), I examine the 
effect of changes in SEC chairman on com-
pliance with Regulation Fair Disclosure. I 
find that a proxy for compliance increases 
sharply when Regulation Fair Disclosure 
becomes effective but that most of this 
increase is reversed when Arthur Levitt (a 
proponent of Regulation Fair Disclosure) is 
replaced as SEC chairman by Laura Unger 
(an opponent). Here the research is informa-
tive about the behavior of both the regulated 
agents and the regulator itself.12 
Shocks can also be generated by technolo-
gies that facilitate hidden behavior. Lin, Qian, 
and Liu (2008) examine the effect of a relax-
ation of abortion restrictions in Taiwan that 
coincided with a sharp growth in demand for 
ultrasound machines capable of determining 
fetus’ sex. The authors find a sharp increase 
in the male share of births when abortion 
was relaxed, especially for older mothers 
and for third and subsequent children, who 
might have stronger incentives to sex-select 
in response to a son preference. They also 
find evidence of a partly offsetting relative 
improvement in the one-month mortality of 
third-born girls. They conclude that parents 
substituted prenatal selection for postnatal 
selection and that “ten more female infants 
12 In a related study, Zitzewitz (2009) examines the 
recovery-to-harm ratio for settlements of mutual fund 
trading cases. In cases negotiated jointly by the SEC and 
the New York Attorney General, regulators achieved a 
ratio of 77 percent; in cases negotiated by the SEC without 
New York, the ratio was only 7 percent. The results provide 
additional evidence that the identity and disposition of the 
regulator has a significant effect on outcomes.
survived for every one hundred that were 
aborted” (abstract). Technology and a legal 
change facilitated one type of hidden behav-
ior (sex-selective abortion, which is illegal 
in Taiwan) but reduced demand for a sub-
stitute (female infanticide or neglect). Qian 
(2008) provides another example of eco-
nomic incentives affecting sex-selection. She 
finds that post-Mao agricultural reforms that 
increased the return to cash crops increased 
the male ratio in areas that produced fruit (at 
which men have a comparative advantage) 
but decreased the ratio in areas that pro-
duced tea (at which women have a compara-
tive advantage).
Krueger and Mas (2004) and Mas (2008) 
examine the effect of shocks to worker–
management relations on product qual-
ity. The former paper finds that defective 
Bridgestone/Firestone tires were dispropor-
tionately produced during times that con-
cessions were being demanded or when the 
plant was employing both permanent and 
replacement workers. The latter paper finds 
that Caterpillar construction equipment 
produced during contract disputes trades at 
a discount on the used market and is more 
likely to be resold, suggesting quality prob-
lems. The Firestone example is especially 
serious, given that defective tires were linked 
to tread separations that caused 271 fatalities 
and over 800 injuries (254). The identifica-
tion approach of these papers is to assume 
that other factors affecting quality vary con-
tinuously, but that incentives or desire to 
“punish” one’s employer (and, ultimately, 
one’s customers) by producing defective 
products increases discontinuously at times 
of unrest. A second approach examines dis-
continuities that have been built into incen-
tives by the incentives scheme’s designers, 
perhaps mistakenly. Oyer (1998) notes that 
many salespeople have incentive pay with 
discontinuities at fiscal year ends and finds a 
similar discontinuity in firm sales around fis-
cal year ends (as compared with other firms 
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in the same industry). This is consistent with 
either increased effort before a year-end or, 
more problematically, with collusion between 
salespeople and customers to book next-year 
orders this year, distorting accounting reve-
nue and earnings figures. Larkin (2007) finds 
salespeople at an enterprise software firm 
have a nonlinear compensation scheme that 
rewards concentrating sales in a single quar-
ter and that salespeople not only concentrate 
their orders but appear to offer significant 
discounts to customers in exchange.
Keys et al. (2010) test whether securitiza-
tion, and specifically the fact that mortgage 
lenders were not exposed to a loan’s long-
term credit risk, led to relaxed underwriting 
standards. The authors exploit the fact that 
while credit risk decreases continuously with 
borrower credit scores, the ease of securitiz-
ing a loan increases discontinuously at cer-
tain credit scores thresholds. The authors 
find that default probabilities are higher for 
loans that just above score thresholds that 
were important for a loan’s securitizability. 
This is consistent with lenders using more 
relaxed underwriting criteria on non-credit-
score signals of borrower risk when a loan 
was more readily securitized, and thus its 
risk more readily transferred to a third party. 
Bubb and Kaufman (2009) have challenged 
this interpretation, showing that discontinui-
ties in default rates exist at score thresholds 
even for loan categories where there is no 
discontinuity in securitization rates. They 
argue that higher default rates above a score 
threshold may be due to lenders using credit 
score thresholds in choosing which loans to 
screen extensively. Another potential expla-
nation is that a borrower with scores just 
above a threshold may be more likely to have 
managed their score to reach that threshold 
and may otherwise be more likely to be less 
creditworthy than their loan file suggests.
Slemrod (1985) notes that tax tables, in 
which tax owed is a staircase-shaped function 
of taxable income, create (small)  incentives 
for (small amounts of) tax evasion. In the 
year studied (1977), tax liability jumped dis-
creetly at the boundaries of $50 tax brack-
ets for all but the highest income taxpayers. 
By underreporting taxable income by $1, a 
tax payer who would otherwise have been at 
the very bottom of one bracket could save 
$7–$21 in tax. Slemrod finds that 23.5 of tax-
payers with marginal rates of 30–42 percent 
(the highest for which the staircase function 
applied) report an income in the top $10 of 
the $50 bracket, compared with 20 percent 
if incomes were distributed continuously, 
suggesting that 3.5 percent of returns in this 
income category engage in manipulation. The 
corresponding percentage for returns that do 
not use the tax tables is 19.7 percent, provid-
ing a nice falsification test. The percentage 
in the top $10 is increasing in marginal tax 
rate and is higher for tax returns for which 
taxable income is “fungible” (e.g., those with 
itemized deductions or self-employment 
income), consistent with evasion increasing 
with incentives and opportunities for it. Saez 
(2010) finds more recent evidence of cluster-
ing of incomes at kinks (i.e., discontinuities 
in the first derivative) in the tax schedule, 
again especially among the self-employed.
Work on earnings manipulation has also 
looked for evidence of incentive disconti-
nuities that arise from the salience of certain 
earnings thresholds to investors with limited 
attention. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
argue that while firms may always benefit 
from reporting higher earnings, these bene-
fits should be discontinuous at certain thresh-
olds: zero and last year’s earnings. Degeorge, 
Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) add analyst’s 
median expectation of earnings as another 
focal threshold. Both papers find that firms 
are especially likely to report earnings that 
just beat these thresholds and unlikely to 
report earnings that just miss these thresh-
olds, suggesting that firms manipulate earn-
ings by transferring profits from one quarter 
to the next. Burgstahler and Dichev also find 
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that firms that just beat thresholds rely dis-
proportionately on components of earnings 
that are known to be manipulatable. Bhojraj 
et al. (2009) confirm this in more recent data 
and find that just beating a threshold with 
low earning quality is followed by positive 
short-term returns, insider selling and equity 
issuance, and negative longer-term returns. 
Grundfest and Malenko (2009) likewise 
find that firms that are especially unlikely to 
report earnings that imply just missing getting 
rounded up to the next penny per share are 
more likely to subsequently restate earnings 
or be sued for accounting fraud. Bollen and 
Pool (2009) make a similar finding for hedge 
funds: hedge funds are much more likely to 
earning barely positive than barely negative 
returns, and the former group of funds has 
lower future returns. Interestingly, the incen-
tives for manipulation are reinforced by the 
fact that missing a threshold takes on a special 
significance in an environment where other 
firms manipulate to avoid missing them, miss-
ing causes investors to infer that a firm has 
exhausted its stock of deferred earnings.13 
Other examples of incentive discontinui-
ties come from sports.14 Duggan and Levitt 
13 Other work on earnings manipulation and incentives 
includes Healy (1985), who finds that accrual policies that 
are consistent with attempts to maximize bonus payments 
and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) who find greater 
use of discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings when 
CEOs have large stock and option holdings. Bergstresser 
and Philippon also find that CEOs and other insiders exer-
cise more options and sell more stock when accruals are 
high. Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006) discuss cycles 
of earnings manipulation via assumed rates of return in 
defined benefit pension plans and executive stock option 
issuance and exercise.
14 The study of sports is controversial, as some econo-
mists regard the lessons as unlikely to generalize to other 
settings. A more optimistic view is that studies of sports are 
like lab experiments that someone else goes to the trouble 
and expense of organizing and that have larger sample sizes 
and arguably more invested participants. Just as the best 
experimental economics studies are carefully designed to 
have as much external validity as possible, the best sports 
economics studies carefully choose settings in which we 
are likely to learn about economic behavior off the play-
ing field.
(2002) study Japanese sumo wrestlers, who 
face a strong incentive to win at least eight 
out of the fifteen bouts in a tournament. 
They find that a wrestler who needs to win 
his last match to reach the threshold is very 
likely to do so, and then very likely to lose 
his next match against the same opponent in 
a later tournament. This suggests that wres-
tlers trade wins in response to the nonlinear 
incentives.
College basketball teams who collude with 
gamblers face a similar incentive disconti-
nuity. Most betting on college basketball is 
“point spread” betting, in which one wagers 
on whether a favored team will win a game by 
at least a certain number of points. A heav-
ily favored teams may collude with gamblers 
who have bet against it and “point shave,” or 
reduce its effort level late in a game to ensure 
that it wins by less than the point spread. 
Wolfers (2006) finds an asymmetric distri-
bution of outcomes: heavily favored college 
basketball teams are much more likely to 
win by just less than the point spread than by 
just more. He concludes that “six percent of 
strong favorites have been willing to manipu-
late their performances” (283).15 
Bernhardt and Heston (2010) challenge 
Wolfers’s interpretation of his result, and 
ironically they do so by examining other 
incentive discontinuities. First, they point 
out that Gibbs (2007) finds a similar distribu-
tion of outcomes for professional basketball 
games, and they argue that bribery of profes-
sional players by gamblers is much less likely 
15 Snyder (2007) conducts a related test for Congressional 
elections, finding that incumbents in Congressional elec-
tions are much more likely to win than lose by a small mar-
gin. Snyder’s setting differs from Wolfers’ in that whereas 
favored basketball teams have no reason to care whether 
they cover the spread (absent side payments from gam-
blers), politicians have strong incentives to care whether 
they win. Snyder’s results could potentially be explained by 
incumbents having better polling data and thus being more 
able to determine the precise amount of effort needed to 
win, although arguably the discontinuity Snyder finds is too 
large to be explained in this manner.
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given high player salaries (Bernhardt and 
Heston, footnote 4). Second, they estimate 
point spreads for college basketball games 
on which bookmakers did not offer betting, 
and find a similarly asymmetric distribu-
tion of outcomes. Rather than finding that a 
proxy for hidden action does change with the 
incentives for it, they find that it does not. 
They argue that Wolfers’s result may have a 
more innocent explanation, such as favored 
teams reducing their effort level with a safe 
lead. While Bernhardt and Heston’s failure 
to find a particular cross-sectional result 
may be due to lacking statistical power, their 
paper provides an example of the importance 
of documenting both positive and negative 
results.
2.3.2  Field Experiments 
An alternative approach to identifying 
hidden behavior is for the researcher to 
experimentally vary incentives for it. This 
approach has been most commonly used in 
studies of tax evasion. Slemrod, Blumenthal, 
and Christian (2001) examine the results of a 
Minnesota Department of Revenue experi-
ment that sent some taxpayers a letter warn-
ing them that they would be audited. They 
found that low and middle-income sole pro-
prietors who received the letter reported 
more income, but there was less evidence 
of an impact on wage earners, who as dis-
cussed above have their income reported 
to the tax authorities by third parties. This 
is consistent with the sole-proprietors who 
were not warned of an audit under reporting 
their income. Kleven et al. (2010) find con-
sistent results from a similar experiment in 
Denmark. Pomeranz (2010) finds that audit 
threat letters sent to one firm increase the 
value added tax (VAT) payments of that firm’s 
suppliers, consistent with the purported self-
enforcement benefits of the VAT. 
Olken (2007) applies a method similar to 
the tax auditing experiments to detect skim-
ming in road building projects in Indonesia. 
In his experimental intervention, govern-
ment audits were announced in advance 
of a randomly selected set of road projects. 
Skimming on these projects and a control 
group of projects was then measured after-
wards by independent audits of road qual-
ity—the materials that were purchased for 
a road project were compared with an esti-
mate of materials used by independent engi-
neers. The independent audits revealed that 
preannouncing a government audit reduced 
skimming by eight percentage points. The 
two types of audits play different roles in the 
context of our taxonomy: the preannounced 
audits provide experimental variation in 
expected enforcement, while the indepen-
dent audits create multiple measures for 
the construction of an estimate of hidden 
behavior.
Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2008) provide 
an example of uncovering shirking by experi-
mentally changing the level of monitoring. 
They evaluated a program that paid teach-
ers bonuses if they attended school each day 
and took a picture of themselves with their 
students with a camera with a tamper-proof 
timestamp. Teacher absenteeism dropped 
to 21 percent (compared with 42 percent 
in control schools) and student test scores 
increased 0.17 standard deviations. The 
response of attendance and test scores to 
the auditing suggests that, absent a special 
program, teacher attendance is poor, existing 
incentives for attendance are weak, and low 
teacher attendance severely harms student 
performance.
2.3.3  Continuous or Binary Variation 
 in Incentives 
A third category of studies examines natu-
ral variation in incentives for hidden behav-
ior, where confounding factors are a potential 
concern. One broad area where this issue 
arises is in testing for whether expert opinion 
is biased by (usually endogenously formed) 
political or commercial relationships or by 
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shared membership in an ethnic or other 
demographic group. In these cases, causal-
ity is often established more through a pre-
ponderance of evidence rather than a single, 
“silver bullet,” statistical test.
For example, Khwaja and Mian (2005a) 
find that firms with politicians as directors are 
able to borrow 45 percent more from banks 
and are 50 percent more likely to default and 
that all of this extra lending and default is 
accounted for by government-owned banks. 
Apart from favoritism, the authors consider 
“social lending” as a possible alternative 
explanation: firms with politician directors 
may be more likely to be engaged in “social” 
activities that further government policy 
goals. They cast doubt on this alternative in a 
variety of ways, including showing that banks 
with explicit social lending goals actually lend 
less to politically connected firms. Faccio, 
Masulis, and McConnell (2006) also find evi-
dence of favoritism towards politically con-
nected firms, specifically that they are more 
likely to receive government bailouts that 
are ultimately financed by the World Bank 
or International Monetary Fund.
Turning to commercial relationships, Lin 
and McNichols (1998) and Michaely and 
Womack (1999) find that more positive stock 
recommendations are issued by analysts who 
work for brokerages that are affiliated with 
investment banks, especially those providing 
underwriting services to the firm in ques-
tion. At least before the regulators inves-
tigations into analysts’ conflicts, one might 
have wondered whether this correlation 
was partly driven by underwriters (who bear 
financial risk from failed offerings) seeking 
clients about which they have positive opin-
ions. Michaely and Womack took an unusual 
approach to distinguishing between the bias 
and selection hypotheses, surveying business 
school graduates working in the industry. 
When provided with a summary of Michaely 
and Womack’s results, 88 percent of the 
surveyed alumni chose “strategic conflict 
of interest” over “selection bias” as the pri-
mary explanation. While one cannot always 
count on the subjects of forensic economics 
research to confess their motives in anony-
mous surveys, when they do, it helps rule out 
alternative hypotheses.
Other papers have examined the impact 
of commercial relationships on the alloca-
tion of underpriced (or “hot”) IPO shares 
in the 1990s. Liu and Ritter (2010) examine 
the behavior of CEOs who were revealed by 
a regulatory investigation to have received 
allocations of other firms’ hot IPOs. They 
find that these CEOs were more likely to 
have underpriced their own IPOs and that 
they were much less likely to switch their 
next offering away from the underwrit-
ers who provided them the allocation. The 
authors interpret this as evidence of a quid 
pro quo in which underwriters use under-
priced IPO shares to “bribe” other firms’ 
CEOs to win their underwriting business. 
Reuter (2006) finds that mutual funds who 
do more brokerage business with an under-
writing firm receive larger allocations of hot 
IPOs, but similarly sized allocations of cold 
IPOs. Subsequent work (Gaspar, Massa, and 
Matos 2006; Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi 
2010; Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz 2010) 
has suggested that these underpriced IPO 
allocations are not allocated pro rata into the 
portfolios whose trading generated them. 
There are alternative reasons an underwriter 
might allocate to investors with whom it has 
commercial relationships; these investors 
might be less likely to sell cold offerings, 
insuring the underwriter against having to 
offer price support. This alternative explana-
tion is inconsistent, however, with the alloca-
tion–relationship correlation being strongest 
for the hottest IPOs. 
Similar issues arise with studies of adver-
tising and media bias. Reuter (2009) finds 
that Wine Spectator provides higher rat-
ings (relative to other publications) to the 
wines of its advertisers. One might wonder 
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whether this arises from tastes, e.g., from 
Wine Spectator’s editors and readers prefer-
ring certain types of wine and from the mak-
ers of these wines advertising to reach those 
readers. Reuter provides evidence that adver-
tisers’ wines are more likely to be retasted 
and have low initial scores adjusted upward, 
which is more consistent with a pro-adver-
tiser bias rather than advertiser self-selection 
based on tastes. Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) 
find that personal finance magazines are 
more likely to recommend the funds of their 
advertisers. Perhaps less so than with wine, 
personal finance magazine readers may have 
tastes for specific types of funds, and firms 
offering these funds may be more likely 
to both advertise in the magazines and get 
mentioned. Given that Reuter and Zitzewitz 
find that the advertising–content correlation 
persists after controlling for funds’ objective 
characteristics (e.g., past returns, expenses), 
the overall level of advertising, and past 
media mentions, a tastes-based explana-
tion would have to be specific to individual 
personal finance magazines and the tastes 
in question would have to be uncorrelated 
with observable characteristics and prior 
coverage. In more recent work, Rinallo and 
Basuroy (2009) provide evidence of a strong 
advertisement–content correlation in fashion 
magazines, and Di Tella and Franceschelli 
(2009) find that the Argentinean government 
reduces advertising in newspapers that cover 
government scandals more heavily.
Tastes as an alternative explanation arise 
in other studies of judging bias. In Zitzewitz 
(2006a), I find evidence of nationalistic bias 
in ski jumping and figure skating judging. 
This bias could be the result of country A’s 
judges favoring country A’s style of skating or 
jumping, but I also find that judges evaluate 
athletes from third countries more favorably 
when they are represented on the judging 
panel. This helps distinguish tastes from 
strategic bias: one might expect country A’s 
judges to have a taste for country B’s style, 
but it is harder to explain why these tastes 
should vary with whether country B has a 
panelist (with whom to potentially exchange 
votes). 
Tastes are also a potential alternative expla-
nation for Price and Wolfers’s (2010) finding 
of own-race biases in foul calls by NBA refer-
ees. One concern is that referees of a certain 
race may favor a style of play that is more 
common among their own race. For exam-
ple, black players on average make more suc-
cessful steals, and white players block more 
shots. Each play involves risking committing 
a specific type of foul (reaching in and hack-
ing, respectively). If black referees monitor 
for hacking or white referees monitor for 
reaching in more aggressively, it could lead 
to referees calling more fouls on other-race 
players. Price and Wolfers find that their 
results are robust to controlling for players’ 
positions and average statistics (including 
steals and blocks), however, casting doubt on 
style of play as the main explanation.16 
Further doubt on a tastes explanation is 
cast by findings of own-race bias in ball–
strike calls by baseball umpires (Parsons et 
al. 2011; Chen 2007). Ball–strike calls are one 
of the more objective judgments in sports 
judging; indeed, both papers control for the 
actual location of the pitch as measured by 
the Questec system of cameras. Parsons et 
al. find evidence of smaller or no bias when 
umpires are well-monitored (by Questec, a 
large crowd, or when the call could lead to a 
walk or strikeout), implying that umpires are 
adjusting bias, consciously or unconsciously, 
in response to monitoring.
16 Price, Remer, and Stone (2012) find that NBA ref-
erees’ discretionary fouls appear biased toward achieving 
game outcomes that would increase league profits (favor-
ing home teams, keeping games close, extending playoff 
series). Their results could also reflect referees having 
tastes for these outcomes, although, here and in other 
cases, allowing tastes to affect judgments might be itself 
considered a form of bias.
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In other studies, the variation in incentives 
is so large that it can reasonably be expected 
to swamp confounding factors. Levitt and 
Syverson (2008) find that houses owned by 
real estate agents sell for 3.7 percent more 
(controlling for observable characteristics) 
and take ten days more to sell. When a real 
estate agent works for a client, she typically 
keeps 1.5 percent of the selling price; when 
selling her own house, she keeps just under 
100 percent. Thus an agent has a much 
stronger incentive to price her own house to 
obtain its full value, even if it requires more 
selling effort. While there may be alternative 
explanations for agents being more patient 
(perhaps they are less credit constrained 
than a typical seller), the differences in 
incentives are so large that they necessarily 
swamp any other economic reason for differ-
ent seller behavior.
Another setting in which alternative expla-
nations, while conceivable, are unlikely to be 
important in practice are studies of school 
behavior around the dates of high-stakes tests. 
Figlio (2006) finds that schools are more likely 
to suspend poorly performing students on test 
days, while Figlio and Winicki (2005) find 
that they serve higher-calorie food on testing 
days. This sort of high-frequency variation 
of policies in an apparent effort to game test 
results may influence our beliefs about a gam-
ing motivation for other findings, such as an 
increased likelihood for marginal students to 
be held back after high-stakes tests are intro-
duced (Figlio and Getzler 2002; Jacob 2005; 
Cullen and Reback 2006).
Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi (2010) study 
another such large incentive difference, 
comparing mutual funds run by firms that 
also offer hedge funds with those that do not. 
Hedge fund managers typically earn incen-
tive fees of 20 percent of funds performance 
(above some threshold), while incentive fees 
for mutual funds are rare and comparatively 
tiny when they exist (Elton, Gruber, and 
Blake 2003). Managers who manage hedge 
and mutual funds side-by-side face a tempta-
tion to favor their hedge funds through legal 
or illegal means: when allocating shares in 
“hot” (i.e., underpriced) IPOs, when decid-
ing which portfolio trades first, or when 
allocating trades among portfolios. Cici, 
Gibson, and Moussawi find evidence that 
side-by-side mutual funds underperform 
matched peer funds by about 1.2 percent 
per year. About 40 percent of this under-
performance is accounted for by differences 
in the above-discussed return gap, which 
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) argue 
captures funds unobserved actions, includ-
ing cross-portfolio favoritism. Cici, Gibson, 
and Moussawi also find that the side-by-side 
funds receive the same allocations of cold 
IPOs, but 40 percent smaller allocations of 
hot IPOs.17 Of course, there can be differ-
ences other than incentives between the 
side-by-side firms and their peers that con-
tribute to these results: managers of side-
by-side funds may be less skilled traders, 
or less well connected and thus less able to 
get allocations of hot IPOs. The differences 
in outcomes are arguably too large to be 
explained by manager skill though, and it is 
far from obvious that mutual fund firms that 
also manage hedge funds should attract less 
skilled managers than their competitors.
A related approach is to test whether hid-
den behavior varies with opportunity, as 
opposed to motive. As discussed above, the 
self-employed have more scope for under-
reporting income on their tax returns. 
Pissarides and Weber (1989) and Feldman 
and Slemrod (2007) test whether the self-
employed spend the same amount on food 
and charitable contributions,  respectively, 
as employees with similar reported incomes. 
17 Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi follow Reuter (2006) in 
inferring IPO allocations from the first holdings disclosure 
following the IPO; Reuter helps validate this approach by 
showing that the correlation between commissions and 
IPO holdings is stronger the closer to the IPO date that 
holdings are disclosed.
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The identifying assumption in the Feldman–
Slemrod tests is that “the source of one’s 
income is unrelated to one’s charitable incli-
nations and that the ratio of true income 
to taxable income does not vary by income 
source” (abstract); Pissarides and Weber 
make an analogous assumption about food 
expenditures (excluding business-related 
meals). The studies find large differ-
ences: food consumption by the U.K. self-
employed and charitable giving by the U.S. 
self-employed is consistent with underre-
porting by factors of 1.55 and 1.54, respec-
tively. While one might wonder whether the 
self-employed have greater networking gains 
from involvement in charity (or work up a 
greater appetite), the differences the authors 
find are so large that they likely primarily 
reflect underreporting. 
Studies of bias and incentives sometimes 
yield counterintuitive results. Hubbard 
(1998) finds that privately owned inspection 
stations are less likely to fail cars (controlling 
for observable car characteristics) than state-
owned stations, despite the incentive created 
by the opportunity to do repair work after a 
failed inspection. The explanation appears 
to be that the incentive to both “diagnose 
and treat” is so salient to customers, so many 
customers assume foul play when failed, 
take the repair and future inspection busi-
ness elsewhere, and spread negative word-
of-mouth. Consistent with this, Hubbard 
(2002) finds that stations are more likely 
to return to a station when they passed last 
year and that stations with higher pass rates 
do more inspections in the future.18 These 
18 Gino and Pierce (2010) find that certain mechanics 
have persistent differential pass rates for luxury brand cars, 
which they attribute to wealth envy. Pierce and Snyder 
(2008) identify firm-effects in emission test pass rates, 
which they attribute to “ethical spillovers” within firms. 
Identification in these papers involves assuming that unob-
servable car characteristics are not correlated within firm 
or within mechanic-brand combinations in ways that would 
produce these results.
results, which suggest an optimistic view of 
consumer sophistication, generally contrast 
with those from a literature in health eco-
nomics on physician-induced demand (see 
McGuire 2000, for a review). One example 
is Gruber and Owings (1996), who find that 
obstetricians in states with more rapidly 
declining birth rates performed cesarean 
deliveries at a higher rate, which they argue 
is consistent with physicians “exploit[ing] 
their agency relationship with patients by 
providing excessive care” (abstract).
Incentives that solve one agency prob-
lem can sometimes create hidden behav-
ior as a side effect (Kerr 1975; Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1991). Malpractice lawsuits 
provide incentives to doctors to practice 
carefully, but may also induce costly and 
potentially harmful defensive medicine 
(Kessler and McClellan 1996; Currie and 
MacLeod 2008). Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997) find that investor demand for 
mutual funds increases in performance but 
that the relationship is convex; demand is 
especially high for funds that finish at the 
very top of the league table. Chevalier and 
Ellison find that funds alter their portfolios 
late in the year in response to these incen-
tives, increasing risk when their incentives 
become more convex. Additional examples 
are provided by the above mentioned stud-
ies of bonus management, earnings man-
agement, and manipulation of sales timing 
and SSRN downloads.
2.4  Model-Based Inference
In forensic economic studies that exploit 
variation in incentives, the identifying 
assumption is usually that incentives for hid-
den behavior are uncorrelated with other 
factors affecting the outcome variables (at 
least once observables are controlled for). 
In these studies, we have a (simple) model 
of how agents interact in the absence of the 
hidden behavior of interest, and identify hid-
den behavior by looking for deviations. In 
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the next section, we turn to other approaches 
that involve testing for deviation from other 
models of behavior. These models include 
economic models, which derive predictions 
by assuming honest behavior by profit-max-
imizing agents that can be potentially falsi-
fied by the data. The models can also include 
statistical models, in which hidden behavior 
is identified by finding outliers.
2.4.1  Economic Models
Auctions are one commonly studied set-
ting that lends itself to economic model-
ing. Most of the literature on collusion in 
auctions studies settings in which collu-
sion is known to have occurred, but some 
of these papers propose methods that can 
be used to test for collusion prospectively. 
Porter and Zona (1993) examine a specific 
form of collusion in government procure-
ment auctions: “complementary bidding” 
where a cartel of bidders agree on a auction 
winner and other cartel members submit 
higher bids in order to make the winning 
bid appear competitive. Their method 
involves estimating a logistic model to pre-
dict the lowest bidder in an auction, esti-
mating an ordered logit model to predict 
the ranking of all bidders, and then testing 
if the coefficients in the two models are 
equal. This test exploits the fact that firms 
should play mixed strategies in auctions, 
and thus their bids should be unpredictable 
(by other bidders and by the econometri-
cian) conditional on observable variables.19 
If firms’ bidding behavior appears related 
to their costs differently in auctions they 
win than in auctions they do not, it suggests 
19 The econometrician is assumed to have observed 
everything the firms have and have correctly specified the 
functional form. Porter and Zona assume that bidder val-
ues are private (i.e., there is no winner’s curse) and inde-
pendent up to a single auction fixed effect. If cartel firms 
had especially correlated costs (e.g., due to being located 
near each other), this could produce bidding that appears 
complementary.
 something observable to the firm, but not to 
the econometrician, that predicts whether 
one will win an auction. A collusive scheme 
is one, and arguably the leading, candidate 
for such an unobservable. 
Porter and Zona (1999) find a differ-
ent deviation from the competitive model 
in their study of a cartel in public school 
milk procurement auctions in Ohio. They 
exploit the fact that milk has relatively high 
shipping costs and thus spatial concerns 
are important. They find that Cincinnati 
firms (who were found by regulators to 
have colluded) had made lower bids for 
distant contracts and higher bids for local 
contracts. This behavior “is consistent with 
local monopoly power, but local monopoly 
power in Cincinnati is consistent only with 
collusion” (287). Pesendorfer (2000) ana-
lyzes two contemporaneous milk cartels: 
one that arranged for the low cost producer 
to win auctions and shared rents with side 
payments (in Florida) and without side 
payments (in Texas). He finds the bidding 
behavior to be consistent with the low cost 
producer winning in Florida (which higher 
cost players could tolerate if they were com-
pensated with side payments) and with con-
tracts being shared, sometimes with higher 
cost providers, in Texas.20 
A bidding ring often conducts an inter-
nal “knockout” auction to determine which 
member will bid seriously in the main auc-
tion (and what side payments they will make 
to the other members in exchange). Asker 
(2010) analyzes data from the knockout auc-
tions conducted by a stamp bidding ring that 
was investigated by the New York Attorney 
General. In knockout auctions, a bidder who 
does not expect to win has an incentive to 
overbid her valuation in order to increase 
20 Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) and Bajari 
and Ye (2003) present frameworks in which one can test 
whether bidding behavior is more consistent with competi-
tive bidding or a specific collusive model.
751Zitzewitz: Forensic Economics
side payments received. Asker finds that two 
ring members rarely won competitive knock-
out auctions and appeared to be participating 
in the ring mainly to receive these payments. 
Ideally, the ring would like to exclude these 
participants, but in practice it may be difficult 
to given that they may then face an incentive 
to confess in exchange for leniency. Asker 
also estimates that the incentive to overbid in 
the knockout auction in some cases may have 
caused the knockout winner to bid above her 
valuation in the final auction. This contrasts 
with Kwoka’s (1997) study of a real estate 
knockout cartel, where he found that collu-
sion significantly depressed prices. 
Beyond auctions, a common approach 
to studying collusion in product markets is 
to estimate a so-called conduct parameter. 
The conduct parameter captures the extent 
to which firms include the profits of their 
competitors in their objective function. A 
common formulation is to assume that firms 
satisfied the following first-order condition:
 c = P + θQP′(Q),
where c was the firm’s marginal cost, Q was 
industry-wide quantity, and P(Q) was an 
industry-wide price level. The parameter θ 
captures the firm’s conduct: θ = 0 represents 
pricing at marginal cost, θ equal to the firm’s 
market share represents Cournot behavior, 
and θ = 1 represents the fully collusive case 
(where the firm acts to maximize industry 
profit).
The parameter θ can also be interpreted 
as the firm’s conjecture about the elasticity 
of industry output with respect to its own 
output, so this approach is also called “con-
jectural variations.” A θ = 1 would imply that 
firms behaved as if they expected a given 
percentage change in its own output to be 
matched by all competitors. As the conjec-
tural variations framing emphasizes, a high θ 
could result from tacit as well as explicit col-
lusion. Charging a high price or  restraining 
output in the belief that competitors will 
respond in kind is likely commonplace, and 
is not illegal if there is no communication.
Genesove and Mullin (2001) provide 
an example and validation of the conduct 
parameter approach.21 They study the sugar 
refining industry in the 1890–1914 period, 
which included episodes of entry and price 
wars, the establishment of a cartel, and 
the gradual erosion of cartel market share 
through the expansion of a competitive 
fringe. The authors find that their estimate 
of θ parameter was highest during periods of 
cartel stability, was lowest during the price 
wars, and declined slowly as the competitive 
fringe grew. It also matched the evidence 
from price–cost margins, which could be 
estimated readily in this industry due to its 
simple production technology. Wolfram 
(1999) conducts a similar exercise for the 
British electric power industry, also find-
ing that margin-based and conduct param-
eter measures of market power are in rough 
accord.
These methods have been critiqued as 
sensitive to the correct specification of the 
model. Porter (2005) notes that tests for 
collusion depend on correctly specifying 
the collusive model, since bidders could 
always modify their behavior to simulate the 
behavior a given model would expect from 
competitive firms with high costs. Corts 
(1999) has critiqued the conduct parameter 
approach as sensitive to assumptions about 
the model of competition and provides simu-
lations of repeated-game collusion in which 
a conjectural variations approach badly over-
estimates the intensity of competition. All 
empirical approaches are potentially sen-
sitive to their maintained assumptions. A 
cost of more complicated methods is that 
these sensitivities are often less transparent 
21 Bresnahan (1989) provides a review of this approach; 
Corts (1999) cites many subsequent papers from the 1990s.
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than when examining simple correlations of 
behavior and incentives.
Model-based inference for forensic 
purposes is conducted outside industrial 
 organization. As discussed above, Knowles, 
Persico, and Todd (2001) test whether racial 
disparities in search rates for motor vehicles 
can be rationalized given racial differences 
in the likelihood of success (e.g., in find-
ing drugs). Gordon (2009) takes a related 
approach to testing for partisan bias in pub-
lic corruption prosecutions. He finds that, 
conditional on being prosecuted and found 
guilty, defendants from the prosecutors’ 
party receive heavier average sentences. 
Assuming sentencing judges do not have 
partisan biases that are negatively corre-
lated with the prosecutor’s, this suggests that 
prosecutors prosecute only the most seri-
ous cases against their co-partisans. In both 
studies, the authors infer a bias if the aver-
age returns to searching or prosecuting one 
group differ, with the assumption being that 
equal average returns implies equal marginal 
returns. Knowles, Persico, and Todd discuss 
this issue at length (212–15), arguing that so 
long as no “type” of motorist is searched with 
probability one, the assumption is valid since 
all types are marginal.22 
The economic models in model-based 
inference are usually, but not always, formal. 
My own work on the stale-price arbitrage of 
22 Other work has studied police profiling by examining 
variation in officers’ incentive or ability to profile. Grogger 
and Ridgeway (2006) compare the racial mix of drivers 
stopped just before and after sunset (using seasonal varia-
tion in sunset time to control for clock time) in Oakland 
and find it is identical, suggesting that Oakland police do 
not condition traffic stops on driver race (for either statisti-
cal or taste reasons). In contrast, Antonovics and Knight 
(2009) find that Boston police officers are more likely to 
stop opposite-race drivers, which they argue is likely con-
sistent with racial differences in officer tastes. Makowsky 
and Stratmann (2009) find that Massachusetts police are 
much more likely to let local drivers off with a warning. 
They do not find large racial differences in ticketing rates, 
but do find that female drivers, especially young females, 
are much more likely to be let off with a warning.
mutual funds provides an example of iden-
tifying hidden behavior based on deviations 
from an informal model of honest behavior. 
U.S.-based mutual funds used to calculate 
the net asset values using closing prices, 
even when those prices were from exchanges 
located in other time zones. This, together 
with the fact that funds allowed trading 
until 4 pm U.S. time, created an arbitrage 
opportunity that was being heavily exploited. 
In Zitzewitz (2003), I calculated that inter-
national equity funds lost an average of 1.1 
percent of their assets in 2001 to stale price 
arbitrage. A sizable number of hedge funds 
were organized with “mutual fund timing” 
as their main strategy (Boudoukh et al. 2002, 
footnote 7).
This trading activity is legal for the trader, 
so the forensic component of the paper was 
understanding why mutual funds toler-
ated it in such large scale. In the paper, I 
noted that while the SEC was encourag-
ing mutual funds to update foreign clos-
ing prices using a process known as “fair 
value pricing,” mutual funds were largely 
attempting to address arbitrage trading 
through short-term trading fees and trading 
restrictions. I noted that the former method 
was cheaper than the latter and had the 
advantage of simultaneously denying the 
arbitrage to everyone, whereas trading fees 
and restrictions could be evaded in numer-
ous ways. I argued that a preference for the 
latter methods could be rationalized if the 
firms were receiving side payments from 
certain arbitrageurs, and thus valued the 
ability to selectively deny opportunities for 
arbitrage. Subsequent regulatory investiga-
tions revealed that at least 20 percent of the 
industry (by assets; Zitzewitz 2009, table 
8) had indeed either taken side payments 
from arbitrageurs or had allowed senior 
managers to arbitrage trade in their own 
funds. While there was no formal economic 
model in this paper, the basic approach is 
the same. The evidence of hidden behavior 
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came from actions that appeared inconsis-
tent with honest agents’ incentives.
2.4.2  Statistical Models 
The other broad model-based approach 
is a statistical approach of looking for events 
that should be rare assuming a given model 
of honest behavior. Jacob and Levitt (2003b) 
look for a specific form of cheating in which 
teachers selected a group of questions from 
the middle of a test and changed their stu-
dents’ answers to the answer the teacher 
deemed correct. This method of cheat-
ing seems at first glance to be quite clever, 
since the teachers avoid raising scores to 
suspicious levels by choosing a subset of 
questions and they economize on effort by 
correcting answers from the harder ques-
tions near the end of a test and the same 
questions across students.
The cheating teachers’ economizing on 
effort turns out to facilitate their detection 
though, since the authors can identify cheat-
ing by finding cases of “suspicious answer 
strings.” In particular, they look for blocks 
of questions in which many students in the 
same classroom had identical (and not nec-
essarily correct) answers. The authors also 
looked for cases where student answers 
were highly correlated within classrooms, 
where the degree of correlation was higher 
for some questions than others, and where 
the students were more likely to correctly 
answer easy questions than hard ones. The 
authors validated their “suspicious answer 
strings” measure of cheating by showing 
that students in these classrooms had large 
score improvements from prior years and 
that these improvements were much more 
likely to mean revert the next year. They also 
found correlations between measured cheat-
ing and proxies for the costs and benefits of 
cheating. Measured cheating is higher for 
classrooms with low prior performance, but 
lower for classrooms with multiple grades 
(which would require cheating on two differ-
ent tests).23 
The Jacob and Levitt study provides an 
example of testing for fraud by looking for 
patterns that are very unlikely under an 
assumed model of honest behavior. Cramton 
and Schwartz (2000) find that bidders of 
analysis of collusion in the FCC spectrum 
auctions signaled desired area codes via the 
last three digits of opening round bids; these 
area codes appeared far more often than if 
the last digits of bids were random (as they 
should be since bidders should play mixed 
strategies). In related work in political sci-
ence, researchers have tested for election 
fraud by exploiting biases people display 
when “making up numbers”—overusing cer-
tain digits, using repeated digits too rarely, 
and using consecutive digits too often. Beber 
and Scacco (2008) find that the last two dig-
its in results from the 2003 Nigerian and 
2009 Iranian elections display these biases, 
but those from the 2002 Swedish and 2008 
U.S. elections do not.24 In statistics, more 
complicated techniques have been used to 
detect bank fraud, money laundering, tele-
communications fraud, computer intrusions, 
medical insurance fraud, and even student 
plagiarism (Bolton and Hand 2002). In 
general, fraud detection in statistics takes a 
more agnostic approach to what honest and 
23  In a subsequent paper, Jacob and Levitt (2003a) 
convinced the Chicago Public Schools to conduct proc-
tored reexaminations in a random sample of classrooms, 
including those of teachers suspected of having cheated. 
They found that proctoring reduced scores for suspected 
cheating teachers, but not for teachers whose scores had 
been anomalously high but did not show suspicious answer 
strings. The effect of proctoring on scores for suspected 
cheaters helps confirm the results of the original study, and 
provides another example of uncovering hidden behavior 
by experimentally varying monitoring (see section 2.3.2 
above).
24 The results for Iran are reported in Beber and Scacco. 
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 hidden behavior one should expect and looks 
for rare events, while economists usually take 
approaches that take advantage of an under-
standing of the incentives for honest and hid-
den behavior. The former approach is often 
applied in settings with very large datasets, 
where the efficiency costs of the more agnos-
tic approach are mitigated and thus the gains 
in robustness are worth the trade-off. 
The Dartmouth Atlas (1998), which has 
created a dataset of medicine practices in dif-
ferent areas of the country, has provided data 
used to identify medical fraud through analy-
sis of rare events. Data from the Atlas helped 
uncover overuse of open-heart bypass sur-
gery in Redding, California, of angioplasties 
in Elyria, Ohio, and a general high utilization 
in McAllen, Texas.25 In the Redding case, 
Tenet Healthcare paid a $54 million fine to 
settle charges of performing unnecessary 
procedures. Silverman and Skinner (2004) 
use data from the Atlas to examine the prac-
tice of “upcoding”: intentionally misdiagnos-
ing one condition for another that allows for 
a higher reimbursement from insurance or 
Medicare. The authors compare the ratio 
of high-reimbursement diagnoses to low-
reimbursement, but closely related, diag-
noses. They found that for-profits hospitals, 
especially those that had recently converted 
to that status, were much more likely to diag-
nose in the higher-reimbursement categories 
and their propensity to do so increased from 
1989 to 1996 and then decreased sharply 
when an investigation was announced. 
Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek 
(1999) propose a test of whether research 
25 For Redding, Elyria, and McAllen, see Pollack, 
Andrew, “California Patients Talk of Needless Heart 
Surgery,” New York Times, 11/4/2002, p. C1 (http://www.
nytimes.com/2002/11/04/business/california-patients-talk-
of-needless-heart-surgery.html), Abelson, Reed, “Heart 
Procedure is Off the Charts in an Ohio City,” New York 
Times, 8/18/2006, A1 (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/
business/18stent.html), and Atul Gawande (2009), respec-
tively (all last accessed 2/2/2011).
results are affected by a “file drawer” bias 
in which results are selected for publication 
based on their statistical significance. They 
examine 96 estimates of the coefficient of 
wages on schooling from twenty-seven dif-
ferent studies, and test whether coefficients 
and standard errors are correlated. The intu-
ition behind this test is that if all coefficients 
are estimates of the same true value and vary 
only due to differences in sample, then the 
point estimates should be uncorrelated with 
the standard errors. If the coefficients are 
instead selected based on the t-ratio, then 
we should expect a positive correlation. The 
authors find evidence of a reporting bias and 
find that meta-estimates of returns to school-
ing drop when bias corrected. Donohue and 
Wolfers (2005) make a similar finding for 
estimates of the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty. Publication bias has also received 
considerable attention in the medical jour-
nals; Dubben and Beck-Bornholdt (2005) 
even conduct an analysis of publication bias 
in studies of publication bias (they do not 
find any).
2.5  Market Efficiency
A final category of forensic economics 
studies identifies hidden behavior using 
null hypotheses derived from financial or 
price theory. In efficient financial markets, 
future asset returns should be uncorrelated 
with currently available public information 
and with decisions that are conditioned on 
this information.26 The work on stock option 
backdating discussed above provides an 
example of a study that exploits this property 
to understand the timing at which decisions 
were made. The studies show that option 
grants represented as having occurred at time 
t are correlated with stock returns between 
t and t + s, which suggests that decisions 
were really made at t + s. As Heron and Lie 
26 See Schwert (1981) and MacKinlay (1997) for reviews 
of the event study methodology.
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(2007) discuss, the fact that the correlation 
disappeared when the SEC began requir-
ing timely disclosure of stock option grants 
helped rule out the inside information expla-
nation in favor of the backdating explanation.
Zitzewitz’s (2006b) work on late trading of 
mutual fund shares provides another example 
of the timing of a decision being misrepre-
sented and of correlations with asset returns 
being used to establish the actual timing. 
Unlike the “market timing” discussed above, 
which involved trading mutual funds to exploit 
biases in valuations, late trading is illegal. 
Mutual fund late traders colluded with bro-
kerage employees to make trading decisions 
after 4 pm Eastern Time but to receive pric-
ing based on 4 pm asset values. One technique 
was for brokerage employees to timestamp 
trading tickets before 4 pm but then destroy 
the tickets if market moves after 4 pm made 
the trade turn out to be disadvantageous. The 
time-stamped trading tickets satisfied tradi-
tional audits, since the stamps were all before 
4 pm. But the uncanceled trades were cor-
related with post-4 pm market movements, 
which was suspicious for exactly the same rea-
son that positive returns after option grants 
were. As with option backdating, the main 
alternative explanation was that the appar-
ent late trades were actually trades made by 
individuals who were able to predict future 
returns. Once again, the fact that the corre-
lation disappeared after investigations into 
late trading were announced helped rule out 
informed trading as the likely explanation.27 
A second application of financial market 
efficiency in forensic economics has been 
to use asset prices to measure investors’ 
expectation of hidden behavior. A series of 
papers examine whether investors expected 
companies to benefit from connectedness 
to politicians who suddenly gained or lost 
power: Suharto (Fisman 2001), Richard 
Cheney (Fisman et al. 2006), George W. Bush 
(Knight 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 
2009), ministers or members of parliament 
in many countries (Faccio 2006), the majority 
party in the U.S. Senate (Jayachandran 2006), 
hometown politicians (Faccio and Parsley 
2009), and Adolf Hitler (Ferguson and Voth 
2008). Generally, these studies have found 
that equity prices increase in response to sud-
den increases in connectedness, suggesting 
that investors expect connected firms to ben-
efit from favoritism. Another example is work 
finding that the stock prices of arms manufac-
turers rise when conflicts intensify in coun-
tries under a U.N. embargo (DellaVigna and 
La Ferrara 2010). These increases are partic-
ularly large for firms that produce small arms 
and ammunitions and for firms located in 
countries perceived as more corrupt, suggest-
ing that investors expect the output of these 
firms to be more likely to find its way to the 
embargoed country. Both the arms embargo 
and the connectedness papers measure inves-
tor expectations about hidden activity, and so 
rely on the efficient market hypothesis twice—
once in interpreting returns around events 
as reflecting changes in expected profits and 
again in assuming that investor expectations 
of profitable hidden behavior are rational.
A third application is to examine price 
changes and volume before public dis-
closures of news in order to understand 
the extent of insider trading on this news. 
Many studies have documented anticipatory 
returns and abnormal volume in advance of 
27 It should be noted that informed trading was a less 
plausible alternative hypothesis for late trading than for 
option backdating. The mutual fund trades were only cor-
related with future returns between 4 and 9 pm, which 
regulatory investigations had revealed was the latest time 
that brokerage employees were able to cancel trades.
 Furthermore, the mutual fund trades were correlated with 
returns on general stock market indices. It is presumably 
more plausible that executives would have inside informa-
tion about the future returns of their own companies than 
a mutual fund trader would have inside information about 
future general stock market returns.
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corporate news announcements (e.g., Beaver 
1968). More recent work has focused on a 
narrower population of agents. Ziobrowski 
et al. (2004) find that the stock trades of 
U.S. Senators were correlated with future 
returns. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008 
and 2010) find that mutual funds managers 
and analysts perform better when investing 
in or opining on the stocks of their class-
mates. Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu (2011) 
find positive returns and abnormal volume 
in advance of U.S.-authorized coups affect-
ing companies at risk of nationalization, sug-
gesting that even the most sensitive classified 
information is traded upon.28 Khwaja and 
Mian (2005b) find that brokers in Pakistan 
appear to engage in a “pump and dump” 
scheme in which they take a position in a 
security, trade among themselves at gradu-
ally escalating prices, and then sell at inflated 
prices to return-chasing investors. Frieder 
and Zittrain (2008) find evidence of price and 
volume changes in lightly traded U.S. stocks 
around the dissemination of unsolicited 
emails that are also consistent with “pump 
and dump” schemes. Touted stocks appreci-
ate significantly in advance of the unsolicited 
email, peak when the touting does and then 
decline sharply. In all these studies, the cor-
relation of current activity with future asset 
price changes appears anomalous precisely 
because efficient market theory casts doubt 
on more innocent explanations. 
A fourth application tests whether firm 
executives are acting in their shareholders’ 
best interests by examining the short and 
long-run stock market response to decisions. 
Identification in these studies is complicated 
by the fact that stock market returns after 
a decision reflect both the impact of the 
28 Related work has examined the price impact of ille-
gal insider trades identified by regulators (e.g., Meulbroek 
1992) and has tested whether publicly disclosed trades 
by corporate insiders exploit inside information (Seyhun 
1986).
 decision on firm value and changes in inves-
tors’ beliefs about other aspects of the firm’s 
situation. Settings must be chosen carefully 
for event returns to be informative about 
the causal effect of a decision on firm value. 
Yermack (2006) finds that companies that 
disclose the personal use of a company jet as 
a CEO perk experience negative announce-
ment and subsequent returns. He also finds 
that this perk is often associated with a CEO 
playing golf at courses a long distance from 
company headquarters (as observed in the 
United States Golf Association handicap 
database). Malmendier and Tate (2009) find 
that firms with CEOs who win media awards 
suffer negative subsequent returns. They 
also find these CEOs are more highly com-
pensated and engage in more outside activi-
ties (board memberships, book writing) and 
attribute this to an adverse “superstar” effect. 
In both examples, it seems unlikely that the 
firm’s decision (buying the CEO a jet, lobby-
ing for a CEO award) is a signal of the firm’s 
prospects being poorer than previously dis-
closed, which increases our confidence that 
the sign of the effect on firm value is cor-
rectly identified.
Hsieh and Moretti (2006) use as their null 
hypothesis a prediction of efficient prod-
uct market theory: namely, the law of one 
price. They examine the gap between the 
price charged by Iraq under its Oil for Food 
program and the price of free-market oil, 
adjusted for transportation costs. They cal-
culate that Iraq underpriced oil sold through 
the program by $1.3 billion. The bulk of the 
underpricing occurred during time periods 
in which buyers were disproportionately 
individual traders rather than multinational 
oil companies; the authors argue that this is 
consistent with the traders being more will-
ing to pay bribes. Once the United Nations 
assumed control of the oil price, underpric-
ing disappeared, suggesting that it was not 




Having organized the above review by 
methodological approach, in this section, I 
discuss some of the common themes from 
the studies’ substantive conclusions. I will 
again focus on common themes that cut 
across subfields, as summaries of field-spe-
cific conclusions have been well covered 
in the reviews cited above. I then turn to 
some of the higher-level issues that the rela-
tive success of academic forensic economics 
work raises.
3.1  What Do We Learn from Forensic 
Economics?
I will highlight five common themes from 
the work reviewed above: the failure of gov-
ernment, the success of incentive theory, 
the persistence of racial and other in-group 
favoritism, the utility of using small-scale 
hidden behavior as a predictor of larger-scale 
hidden behavior, and the power of small 
interventions.
The fact that government failure emerges 
as a theme from forensic economics work is 
probably not a surprise, given that concern 
about corruption is a major motivation for 
the work in development. Perhaps more 
surprising is the evidence about the perfor-
mance of developed country or international 
institutions, with examples ranging from 
the Chicago Police to the SEC, the United 
Nations, local governments in the United 
States, and even the governing bodies of sev-
eral major sports.
The evidence of government failure is 
particularly worrisome given the evidence 
about the performance of the media, usu-
ally thought to be the primary check on 
government failure in modern democracies. 
An advertiser-supported media faces signifi-
cant disincentives to raise issues that conflict 
with their advertisers’ interests. This is true 
both when the government or state-owned 
firms are major advertisers or even owners, 
or when both government and the media 
are potentially influenced by the same inter-
est group. As discussed in the introduction, 
the imperfect performance of the govern-
ment and media are precisely what creates 
the opportunity and, arguably, the need for 
academics to get involved in forensic work 
to begin with.
A second recurring theme from the review 
is the power of incentives in explaining hid-
den behavior. In Becker’s (1968) seminal 
economic model of crime, potentially crimi-
nal agents trade off the returns to crime 
with the probability of and punishment from 
being caught. In many, if not most, of the 
studies discussed above, we observe hid-
den behavior increasing with the incentives 
for it, and declining sharply with increases 
in scrutiny or enforcement. Indeed, as dis-
cussed, testing for these changes is one of 
the major techniques used to identify or con-
firm the existence of hidden behavior in the 
first place.
With that said, it has long been recognized 
that a model of the decision making leading 
to crime or other unethical behavior has to 
allow for factors such as tastes or mispercep-
tions, since many individuals routinely abstain 
from behavior that would otherwise be util-
ity maximizing and some engage in criminal 
behavior that is difficult to rationalize, given 
the high probability of punishment. There 
is likewise some behavior observed in the 
surveyed studies that is difficult to rational-
ize. Given the wealth levels of the individuals 
involved, the clearest examples come from 
finance. Stock option backdating was engaged 
in by wealthy individuals for relatively small 
gains, despite the fact that it constituted 
both accounting and tax fraud. In Zitzewitz 
(2006b), I note the fact that late trading usu-
ally added little to the expected return to an 
already profitable (and legal) stale-price arbi-
trage trading strategy, yet about 60 percent 
of the dollars engaged in stale-price arbitrage 
were also engaged in late trading. The use 
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and acceptance of hot IPO shares as apparent 
bribes for investment banking business like-
wise involved relatively small financial gains 
for running fairly serious legal and reputa-
tional risks. But notwithstanding that caveat, 
the meta-field of forensic economics owes a 
significant intellectual debt to the economics 
of crime.
A third common theme is the persis-
tence of racial and other forms of favorit-
ism, in settings as varied as housing, hiring, 
and sports judging. Some of the evidence is 
plausibly of statistical discrimination, while 
other cases appear more likely taste-based. 
One approach taken to distinguish between 
the two was a version of the outcomes test 
advocated by Becker (1957). If black motor-
ists are searched more frequently by police 
despite lower search success rates, as Anwar 
and Fang (2006) find in Florida, this sug-
gests that tastes may contribute to the higher 
search rates. If instead searches of black 
motorists have higher success rates, as in 
Maryland, then, at least under the assump-
tions of Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001), 
the higher search rate reflects statistical 
discrimination.29 
A second approach taken to identify taste-
based discrimination is to attempt to elimi-
nate statistical discrimination by carefully 
controlling the information available. Audit 
studies test for discrimination by present-
ing agents with job candidates or real estate 
buyers with identical nonracial characteris-
tics. Resume or test grading studies control 
even more carefully the information avail-
able. A third approach studies the relatively 
rare  settings in which agents make objective 
29 Crucial assumptions in Knowles, Persico, and Todd’s 
model are that every observable driver type is searched 
with probability less than one and that police equalize mar-
ginal success rates across driver types. If instead there is a 
type of black motorist that police search at every oppor-
tunity, then high success rates for this type could drive up 
average success rate for all black motorists, masking taste-
based discrimination against other types of black motorists.
 evaluations of performance (e.g., ball and 
strike calls), the researcher observe the rel-
evant facts as well as the agent, and thus the 
study can directly compare agents’ evalu-
ations with an objective measure (e.g., of 
pitch location). 
An important caution about these stud-
ies is that disparate treatment may not lead 
directly to disparate outcomes. In particular, 
settings in which potentially discriminatory 
agents face competition (e.g., employers, 
real estate, and autos) at least offer consum-
ers the ability to shop for less discrimination; 
such shopping should be most helpful when 
discrimination is taste-based, but tastes for 
it are not universal.30 In contrast, settings in 
which the potentially discriminatory agent 
is a monopolist (e.g., judges, prosecutors, 
police officers, test graders, umpires) argu-
ably deserve the most scrutiny. 
A fourth common theme is the correla-
tion of small-scale (and often legal) misdeeds 
with larger-scale malfeasance. Examples 
include diplomats’ (legally) unpaid parking 
tickets being correlated with serious home-
country corruption, rounding down on tax 
returns or up on corporate earnings being 
correlated with more serious fraud, and the 
presumably run-of-the-mill misbehavior that 
accompanies an industrial dispute being cor-
related with the making of defective tires 
that killed drivers in rollover accidents. The 
policy implications of these findings are not 
always straightforward, however, as a policy 
of auditing round-number tax returns may 
simply induce the abandonment of small-
scale cheating by the large-scale cheats.
A fifth common theme is that relatively 
inexpensive interventions can often have 
large impacts. The simple health  inspection 
30 Consistent with shopping partially alleviating discrim-
ination, Charles and Guryan (2008) find that racial wage 
gaps are most negatively correlated with the prejudice of a 
state’s least prejudiced members (specifically, with the 10th 
percentile of a survey-based prejudice).
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score disclosure policy studied by Jin and 
Leslie (2003, 2009) had large health effects. 
The fairly inexpensive teacher attendance 
monitoring scheme studied by Duflo, Hanna, 
and Ryan (2008) had large effects on student 
performance. Olken’s (2007) study of the 
effect of audits on materials theft is likewise 
encouraging. The scrutiny created by foren-
sic economic papers themselves has likewise 
had an impact in some cases, which I turn to 
in the next subsection.
3.2  Uneven Policy Impact
One of the prime ways for forensic eco-
nomics to make a social contribution is to 
affect policy for the better. While many 
of the studies discussed above do not have 
immediate policy implications, impact has 
varied widely for the ones that do. Macey and 
O’Hara (2009) discuss this variation, focus-
ing on three cases in which policy reacted to 
forensic economics findings (Nasdaq mar-
ket making, mutual fund trading, options 
backdating) and one where it initially did 
not (Senate insider trading). Ritter (2008) 
emphasizes the role of the press in dissemi-
nating findings and creating pressure for 
policy changes, while Macey and O’Hara 
acknowledge the role of the press but also 
emphasize regulators’ incentives. Regulators 
other than the SEC became involved in the 
first three cases (the Department of Justice, 
the New York Attorney General, and the IRS, 
respectively), while Macey and O’Hara argue 
that the SEC might have had limited incen-
tive to investigate the Senate, which appoints 
its commissioners and sets its budget.
Beyond these four studies, impact has 
been likewise mixed. Jin and Leslie’s (2003) 
and Simon et al.’s (2005) evidence of the 
hygiene improvements and hospital admis-
sion reductions due to publicly displayed 
grading cards in Los Angeles helped moti-
vate their adoption by a few states (North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia) and 
cities (San Francisco, St. Louis, New York). 
This is a success story, but the fact that these 
did not become universal after their findings 
were disseminated is arguably a failure. In 
contrast, the dramatic increase in resources 
reaching schools in Uganda after the news-
paper campaign publicizing the level of theft 
is impressive. One often-critiqued feature 
of the press is its limited attention span; if 
policy impact depends on the press, there is 
potential for backsliding once initial attention 
fades. Many of the reforms aimed at address-
ing broader investor–manager conflicts in 
mutual funds proposed by the SEC after the 
2003 mutual fund scandal were subsequently 
weakened or dropped when media attention 
faded (e.g., compensation disclosure, inde-
pendent chairs for fund boards). A follow-up 
study in Uganda to assess the permanency of 
the media’s effect there would be useful. 
Another form of policy impact from 
forensic economics is the arming of regula-
tors and investigators with new tools. These 
tools are most useful when they are simple 
enough for nonexperts to implement and 
when the agents under study cannot modify 
their behavior in a way that foils detection. 
Methods that capture the full impact of the 
hidden behavior, rather than a symptom 
of that behavior, do better on this second 
dimension. For example, there is little incen-
tive to do option backdating, mutual fund 
late trading, or insider trading in a way that 
avoids a correlation with stock returns, since 
it is this correlation that makes the activity 
profitable in the first place.
In contrast, using small-scale fraud as 
a predictor of larger-scale fraud may only 
work until the practitioners learn to avoid 
the small-scale fraud, as discussed above. 
Likewise, approaches involving multiple 
measures may not be as robust if the second 
measure can be manipulated. For example, 
if China tried to detect smuggling by com-
paring its import statistics with Hong Kong’s 
export data, smugglers could presumably 
start misreporting to Hong Kong. Second 
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measures based on direct observation or 
auditing (e.g., of road thickness or of rice 
that actually reaches villages) may be harder 
to manipulate, but only if they remain under 
the control of incorruptible institutions. 
Studies based on incentive correlations or 
discontinuities might be likewise vulnerable 
to manipulation. Point shavers may start los-
ing games by even more points, and agents 
might steal more even when incentives to 
do so are weak to avoid suspicious correla-
tions. A specific model-based approach is 
often quite easy to fool given knowledge 
of the model being used, so this approach 
often depends in practice on keeping pre-
cise methods secret from agents. The exact 
approaches taken to detect bank fraud, for 
instance, are closely guarded secrets for this 
reason. Unfortunately, governments, and 
particularly democracies, are not always suc-
cessful at keeping secrets. A race between 
the development of techniques by inves-
tigators and their discovery and evasion 
by agents may result, with the equilibrium 
effectiveness of forensic techniques depend-
ing on many factors, including the relative 
sophistication of the two sides.
3.3  Reaction of the Research Subjects
There is also significant heterogeneity 
in how the subjects of forensic economics 
have reacted to it. For many studies, espe-
cially those of rogue individuals, this issue 
is often moot, since these individuals are 
either anonymous (tax evaders) or already 
convicted (collusive dairies) by the time 
of the research. In other cases though, the 
subjects of the research are governments or 
large firms or institutions, often in the coun-
tries where the economists reside or conduct 
their field work.
One possible dimension of reaction is 
expanding or restricting one’s data shar-
ing policy. Forensic economics might cre-
ate incentives for firms or governments to 
withhold data, or share it more selectively, 
in ways that harm economic research more 
generally. On the other hand, it might 
encourage parties with an interest in limit-
ing hidden behavior, such as the principals 
of the agents who might engage in it, to 
increase disclosure, essentially partnering 
with forensic economists in the process. 
An encouraging example is the Chicago 
Public Schools engaging Jacob and Levitt 
(2003a) to help them catch cheating teach-
ers; the school system apparently correctly 
viewed themselves as one of the parties 
being cheated. A less encouraging example 
is the International Skating Union react-
ing to the vote-trading scandal at the 2002 
Olympics by first deleting country identifiers 
from their score sheets and then by making 
judges’ scores anonymous, a change which 
was accompanied by an increase in judging 
biases (Zitzewitz 2010). Another is Thomson 
Financial’s new policy of refusing to share 
with academics the files that identify specific 
brokerage firms and analysts in their data 
following Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston’s 
work and the decisions of Merrill Lynch and 
Lehman Brothers to ask Thomson to remove 
their data from the version of I/B/E/S dis-
tributed to academics.31 In these cases, the 
principals with an interest in restraining hid-
den activity (consumers of figure skating or 
I/B/E/S data) are not well organized, and the 
parties that could intervene (TV networks, 
corporate subscribers to I/B/E/S) may inter-
pret their self interest as not being aligned 
with transparency.
Subjects of forensic economics can react 
in other ways. One approach might be char-
acterized by the Washington saying “admit 
nothing, deny everything, make counter 
31 Subscribers to I/B/E/S via Wharton Research Data 
Services can view notices of the I/B/E/S policy change at 
http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ds/ibes/translation1.shtml 
and http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ds/ibes/translation2.
shtml. Merrill Lynch’s and Lehman Brothers’ decisions 
are discussed at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/news/
sideitem/user2007/analyst_data.pdf (p. 21).
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accusations.” A director at a large mutual 
fund company complained to the publisher 
of Financial Analysts Journal about the pub-
lication of Boudoukh et al. (2002).32 The 
letter conceded that the article “may be 
‘technically correct’” but complained that the 
article had “ethical shortcomings” because it 
“outlines how investors can profit [from long-
term mutual fund shareholders] by taking 
advantage of pricing differences in interna-
tional mutual funds” and called the decision 
to publish the article “abhorrent.” The let-
ter also claimed that “the use of ‘fair value 
pricing’ has effectively closed the arbitrage,” 
which was false at the time it was written (in 
late 2002) and indeed in late 2009 is still not 
completely true.33 The publisher replied in 
part that publishing technically correct but 
potentially controversial articles was part of 
its mission and stated that “fostering open 
discussion of controversial issues encourages 
research that will benefit the profession and 
investors in general.” The authors subse-
quently replied that “the real issue is what 
the mutual fund industry will do to curtail 
such activity” and noted that few if any funds 
were disclosing the issue to their investors.34 
The NBA responded to Price and Wolfers’ 
results about racial biases by commissioning 
a report of their own, in which they reached 
opposite conclusions. The report was never 
released publicly, and Wolfers has claimed 
that it actually confirms the findings of the 
original study, if the results are properly 
32 “From the Editor,” Financial Analysts Journal 58(6), 
17.
33 In the letter writer’s defense, he may not have had 
the econometric skills to know this, since it would have 
required running a regression to check (albeit a uni-
variate regression using data easily downloaded from the 
Internet). It should also be mentioned that the letter writ-
er’s employer was not one the firms subsequently revealed 
to have made special arrangements with arbitrageurs.
34
 
 “ ‘Stale Prices and Strategies for Trading Mutual 
Funds’: Authors’ Response,” Financial Analysts Journal 
59(1), 15.
interpreted.35 Thomson Financial initially 
called the Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston 
(2009) study “a hatchet job” and claimed that 
the authors did not understand the I/B/E/S 
data, a claim inconsistent with the extensive 
corrections they subsequently made to their 
data to address the identified issues.36 All 
else equal, researchers and journal editors 
would likely prefer to avoid fights, particu-
larly with well-financed entities, and so these 
responses may have some of their intended 
chilling effect on forensic economics work.
More serious reactions are unfortunately 
conceivable. The willingness of researchers 
to publish results that are likely unpopular 
with governments in which they do their 
research is commendable, particularly in 
cases of governments that are less than 
respectful of the rule of law.
3.4  Missed Opportunities and Next Steps
This review discusses many instances 
where economists uncovered or quantified 
hidden behavior of both scholarly and soci-
etal importance. Of course, time spent on 
forensic economic research has an oppor-
tunity cost, and one might wonder whether 
academic forensic economics has reached 
the point of diminishing returns. 
It may therefore be fitting to conclude by 
discussing failures—instances where forensic 
economics could have identified important 
hidden behavior, but failed to. One widely 
discussed example is Bernard Madoff’s ponzi 
scheme. Madoff feeder funds such as the 
Fairfield Greenfield Sentry fund were in the 
major hedge fund datasets used by research-
ers and their returns were likely included as 
35 See Wolfers’ comments quoted in Babay, Emily, 
“Study indicates racial bias in NBA refereeing,” Daily 
Pennsylvanian, 5/11/2007 (http://www.dailypennsylvanian.
com/node/53119, last accessed 2/2/2011).
36 Alpert, Bill, “Technology Trader: Mysterious Changes 
in Key Wall Street Data,” Barron’s, 3/5/2007, p. 39 (http://
online.barrons.com/article/SB117288153945425442.html, 
last accessed 2/2/2011).
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data points in studies of manager skill. These 
returns look very anomalous. From 1990 to 
2006, the Sentry fund’s annual Sharpe ratio 
was consistently high, with a mean of 3.23 
and a standard deviation of 0.62, for a ratio 
of 5.17. For the 850 hedge funds with at least 
ten years’ data in the Hedge Fund Research 
dataset during that time period, this ratio 
(the Sharpe ratio of the Sharpe ratio) aver-
aged 0.82 (SD 0.51), implying a z-score of 
8.5 for the Madoff fund. All six funds with a 
z-score above 3.2 have since been found to 
either be Madoff feeder funds or involved in 
unrelated frauds. In this vein, recent stud-
ies by Brown et al. (2009), Bollen and Pool 
(forthcoming), and Dimmock and Gerken 
(2012) have shown a broader set of ex ante 
indicators are predictive of eventual hedge 
fund fraud. 
The excessive heart surgeries in Redding 
provide another example. The Dartmouth 
Atlas data was very helpful to investigators 
in confirming Redding’s outlier status once 
whistleblowers came forward, but Atlas 
data on the extremely high surgery rate in 
Redding had been available for years, and 
so conceivably the behavior could have 
been uncovered and halted sooner. Since 
the Redding case, the Atlas data has been 
used more prospectively to uncover specific 
instances of waste, or worse.
These examples are, of course, much easier 
to find with hindsight. The point in mention-
ing these missed findings is to illustrate that 
while past investment in forensic economics 
work may or may not have reached the point 
where marginal benefits and marginal costs 
are equalized, it has clearly not reached the 
point where the marginal benefits are zero. 
More and earlier investment might have 
caught these examples we now know about, 
along with other examples we do not.
Another class of missing findings are 
cases where the data exists, but researchers 
have been unable to access it. Favoritism 
across investment portfolios provides one 
 example. We have results that are  suggestive 
of  favoritism, such as return gaps or hot 
IPO holdings that are correlated with man-
ager’s incentive to favor portfolios. But 
much more direct tests could be conducted 
with transaction-level data from the manag-
ers themselves. The SEC could access this 
data as part of its regular examinations and 
conduct tests for favoritism. If it does so, a 
public report on the extent of portfolio favor-
itism would be valuable. Alternatively, if the 
SEC does not have the analytical resources 
needed, the data could simply be required to 
be disclosed, and a community of research-
ers would likely conduct the analysis for free.
This is one example of a technique poli-
cymakers could apply more widely. In areas 
where there are suspicions, but no system-
atic evidence, of hidden behavior, policy-
makers could confer with researchers about 
the data required to test for this behavior, 
and then require its disclosure. For impor-
tant types of hidden behavior, the academic 
community would likely conduct the analysis 
for free, and the combination of competi-
tion among researchers and widespread data 
availability would help ensure that the results 
obtained were accurate. One area where this 
technique is already being applied is in gov-
ernment procurement, where mandatory 
disclosure provided data for several studies 
discussed above.
Yet another class of missed findings are 
negative findings. This is, of course, a com-
mon problem with many lines of inquiry. 
We have a few examples above of academic 
work challenging forensic results—the work 
on backdating challenging prior work sug-
gesting that option grants exploited inside 
information, work on statistical discrimina-
tion providing alternative explanations for 
racial differences in treatment, and work 
challenging conclusions of point shaving. 
There were also statements by academics 
challenging Christie and Schultz’s interpre-
tation of  odd-eighths avoidance as evidence 
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of collusion.37 While the low apparent false 
positive rate for forensic economics may be 
genuine, one might question whether there 
are adequate incentives to produce work that 
overturns forensic results.
4. Conclusion 
Understanding hidden behavior has 
become a central component of the research 
agenda in many subfields of economics. This 
survey has reviewed a variety of techniques 
economists have adapted or developed for 
detecting such behavior. While forensic 
economics has been developing relatively 
independently in many fields, there is con-
siderable overlap in the techniques used, as 
well as some common themes in the substan-
tive findings.
It is sometimes argued that econom-
ics missed forecasting the current financial 
crisis. If we accept a common view of the 
financial crisis as an unexpectedly toxic com-
bination of known components, it is worth 
noting that many of these components were 
known, or at least better known, through 
forensic economics. Examples include mis-
leading accounting, manager–investor con-
flicts of interest in asset management, a 
race for yield (and window dressing of the 
risk), and lax or arguably industry-captured 
financial regulation. Postcrisis forensic work 
has also begun investigating lender–investor 
conflicts of interest in securitization. If hid-
den behavior played a role in the crisis, then 
forensic economics will likely play a role in 
understanding exactly what happened.
A lack of interesting and economically 
important hidden behavior to study is not 
likely to be what constrains the future of 
forensic economics, however. Most forensic 
37 For example, see the Financial Economists 
Roundtable’s “Statement on the Structure of the Nasdaq 
Stock Market,” available at http://www.luc.edu/orgs/
finroundtable/statement95a.html (last accessed 11/19/2009).
economics work relies on data created and 
disclosed by others. If disclosure decisions 
are delegated to those with an interest 
in opacity, this will constrain the growth 
of knowledge, forensic and otherwise. In 
contrast, if policy harnesses the talents 
of economists and other researchers, the 
future of forensic economics may be bright 
indeed. 
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